The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense by Chiang, Tun-Jen
Copyright  2013  by  Tun-Jen Chiang Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  107,  No.  3 
1243 
THE UPSIDE-DOWN INEQUITABLE  
CONDUCT DEFENSE 
Tun-Jen Chiang 
ABSTRACT—“Inequitable conduct” is a patent law doctrine that renders a 
patent unenforceable when the patentee is found to have acted improperly 
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. It is widely reviled and 
frequently criticized for being draconian: the Federal Circuit has famously 
called the doctrine an “absolute plague” that terrorizes patent owners. 
Responding to the concern about overdeterrence, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly narrowed the doctrine. 
This Article takes a different perspective. The conventional wisdom is 
correct enough in arguing that the inequitable conduct doctrine sometimes 
produces overdeterrence. What has been overlooked, however, is the fact 
that the doctrine also produces underdeterrence. Specifically, as this Article 
will demonstrate, the unenforceability penalty creates too much deterrence 
against minor errors, but it also produces inadequate deterrence against the 
most serious patentee frauds. In this way, the doctrine is upside down. 
Once we understand that there is an underdeterrence problem, it 
quickly becomes evident that conventional proposals to narrow liability 
(which the Federal Circuit has generally adopted) are misguided. 
Narrowing the inequitable conduct doctrine can mitigate the overdeterrence 
problem, but only at the price of exacerbating the underdeterrence problem. 
At the same time, the Article will demonstrate that expanding liability, as 
some have argued, is no better: it simply exacerbates the overdeterrence 
problem. Rather than focus on the liability standard, the proper solution is 
to reform the penalty in a way that addresses both the over- and 
underdeterrence effects. 
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“Inequitable conduct” is a patent law doctrine designed to ensure that 
patent applicants are honest in their dealings with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO). 1  The doctrine achieves this by rendering a 
dishonestly obtained patent unenforceable.2 Although this outcome might 
seem quite unobjectionable to an outsider, the doctrine in fact attracts more 
passionate loathing, and stronger criticism, than any other doctrine in 
patent law. As a striking example, the Federal Circuit calls the inequitable 
conduct doctrine an “absolute plague” that terrorizes patent owners,3 and 
 
1 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1111 (5th ed. 2011) (inequitable conduct “harnesses the private interests of litigants in 
an effort to police the integrity of the patent system”). 
2 See id. 
3 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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calls the unenforceability penalty an “atomic bomb.”4 Other members of 
the patent community regularly voice similar sentiments—in government,5 
in the academy, 6  and among practitioners. 7  The consensus is that the 
unenforceability penalty is always harsh and draconian—akin to a fixed, 
mandatory $1 million fine. Responding to this view, courts have repeatedly 
narrowed the inequitable conduct doctrine to ensure that the million-dollar fine 
is applied only to million-dollar crimes.8 Calls for even more narrowing—
or for outright abolition—are common.9 
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom misunderstands the 
effect of the unenforceability remedy, and this misunderstanding leads to 
the wrong solutions. In truth, the unenforceability remedy is not analogous 
to a flat $1 million fine that is severe in all cases. Rather, the effect of the 
unenforceability remedy is variable.10 If the patent is valid under the true 
state of facts, then rendering the patent unenforceable is a very severe 
punishment. But if the patent is already invalid for independent reasons, 
then holding an invalid patent unenforceable creates no punishment or 
deterrence against dishonesty. 
The fact that the severity of the unenforceability penalty varies with 
the validity of the patent has been largely overlooked in the existing 
literature and case law,11 and it produces three implications. The first is that 
patentees have upside-down incentives to engage in dishonest conduct. As I 
 
4 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, 
J., dissenting)). 
5 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Keynote Address, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2010) 
(criticizing the inequitable conduct defense). 
6 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 762–70 (2009) (arguing that inequitable conduct doctrine results in 
overdisclosure); Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1390–94 (2009). 
7 See, e.g., John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability 
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7 (1988) (arguing for abolition). 
8 See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(arguing for a high burden of proof because “the penalty . . . is so severe”); Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 
1349 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that inequitable conduct should be limited to “only the most 
extreme cases of fraud and deception”). 
9 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–78 (arguing for narrowing the doctrine); Mammen, supra 
note 6 (same); see also Lynch, supra note 7 (arguing for elimination of inequitable conduct as a defense 
to patent enforcement). 
10 To be clear, I am referring here only to the magnitude of the punishment, without regard to 
culpability. Thus, a million-dollar fine is “severe” even when it is applied to a million-dollar crime. I 
will consider culpability next. 
11 As I discuss in Part III, shades of this point are sometimes made in judicial opinions, especially 
the dissent in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting). But the judges making this point clearly do not appreciate its full 
implications because their proposed solution—to expand liability—actually makes the problem even 
worse. 
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shall demonstrate in Part I, the unenforceability remedy creates no 
deterrence precisely for the biggest lies, while it creates very strong 
deterrence against the smallest errors. An example will illustrate this 
dynamic: the most culpable type of patentee misconduct is perhaps 
shredding unfavorable test results proving that the patentee’s claimed 
invention does not work. But in order to prove an inequitable conduct 
charge, someone must first find the shredded documents and reassemble 
their contents, and once this is done the patent will be invalidated—because 
the invention does not work, not because of the shredding of documents. 
There is thus no punishment levied for the document shredding, and a 
patentee who receives unfavorable test results thus has every incentive to 
shred them. To generalize from the example, the problem with inequitable 
conduct doctrine is that the more damaging the information being 
concealed, the more likely the patent will be found invalid once the truth is 
exposed; but the unenforceability penalty can only be applied after the 
concealment is discovered and the truth exposed, so it is most likely to be 
superfluous precisely in the cases of the biggest lies. Punishment and 
deterrence therefore vary inversely with culpability. 
Although the insight is simple, this portrait of inequitable conduct as 
upside down differs from the common understanding of the literature. 
Existing scholarship overwhelmingly argues that inequitable conduct 
produces overdeterrence and should be narrowed across the board.12 A few 
isolated voices argue that inequitable conduct produces underdeterrence 
and should be expanded across the board.13 My argument is that inequitable 
conduct is not uniform in its effect, that it produces both over- and 
underdeterrence at the same time, and that a solution should be tailored for 
both effects. 
The second implication is that the variability of the penalty produces 
upside-down incentives for accused infringers in litigation. As I shall 
demonstrate in Part II, the more serious the misconduct by the patentee, the 
less likely it is that an accused infringer will choose to litigate an 
inequitable conduct claim to expose that misconduct. This produces an 
important selection effect. Over time, courts will see many claims of 
inequitable conduct made over trivial mistakes, but they will almost never 
see any claim involving serious misconduct. 14  This “availability bias” 
means that judges will start to believe that truly serious patentee 
 
12 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 762–70, 774–78; Mammen, supra note 6; Melissa Feeney 
Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–23 (2008). 
13 See David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 975–77 (2010) (arguing 
for loosening the intent and pleading requirements). 
14 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating 
that accusations of inequitable conduct are “an absolute plague” because accused infringers succeed in 
only “a small percentage of the cases”). 
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misconduct almost never occurs.15 The result is that the same judges will 
narrow inequitable conduct doctrine, which is precisely what has happened 
in real life.16 My point is that this belief in patentee honesty, which has 
driven much doctrinal change, is based on an illusion. 
The third implication is that reform should focus more on adjusting the 
remedy for inequitable conduct and less on the standard for attaching 
liability. One effect of the conceptualization of the unenforceability remedy 
as unchanging and severe—akin to a flat $1 million fine—is that the debate 
focuses on the standard for liability. Those who believe that inequitable 
conduct produces overdeterrence focus on raising the burden of proof and 
narrowing liability.17 The minority who believe that inequitable conduct 
produces underdeterrence focus on lowering the burden of proof and 
expanding liability.18 My argument in Part III is that neither type of reform 
is likely to work because they both fail to consider the upside-down nature 
of the unenforceability remedy. As discussed above and elaborated in Part 
I, the problem with inequitable conduct is that the penalty is too low in 
highly culpable cases but is too high in trivial cases. Narrowing liability 
(the dominant position) does ensure that the trivial cases are not penalized, 
but it does nothing to fix the underdeterrence problem for high-culpability 
cases, and so too much dishonesty will occur before the PTO. Expanding 
liability (the conventional minority position) without fixing the penalty 
structure is even worse: it means that trivial cases will now be 
overpenalized, but it does nothing to fix the underdeterrence problem in 
high-culpability cases because the penalty there will still be too low. 
Part IV outlines my proposed solution, which is to abolish the 
unenforceability remedy and replace it with a more direct penalty like a 
monetary fine that can be tailored to the degree of culpability. This Part 
then addresses some potential objections. A conclusion follows. 
I. UPSIDE-DOWN DETERRENCE FOR PATENTEES 
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that the unenforceability 
remedy produces upside-down incentives for patentees. As sections B 
through D will show, the more culpable the misconduct by the patentee, the 
less deterrence the unenforceability remedy will provide. The key factor 
 
15 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
16 See Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (2011) (“Inequitable [c]onduct [j]urisprudence [e]vinces a [s]trong 
[p]reference for [p]atentee [s]uccess.”); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
17 See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both 
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused . . . .”); Cotropia, supra note 
6, at 775–83; Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving, 11 WAKE FOREST 
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26–29 (2010) (arguing for more rigorous materiality and intent 
requirements). 
18 See McGowan, supra note 13. 
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driving this result is the fact that, by the time an inequitable conduct charge 
is proved and the truth exposed, the patent will be independently found 
invalid, rendering the unenforceability penalty superfluous. Because the 
interaction between invalidity and unenforceability is key to the argument, 
section A first offers a brief discussion of the difference between these two 
concepts. 
A. Invalidity Versus Unenforceability 
1. Invalidity.—Consider an inventor, Andy, who claims to have 
invented a widget and files a patent application with the PTO. The job of 
the PTO is to issue patents that are valid and prevent invalid patents from 
issuing.19 A patent is valid if the invention is new, useful, and nonobvious.20 
That is, the invention must work (useful), not be previously known (new), 
and also be sufficiently advanced over what was previously known to merit 
a patent (nonobvious). Conversely, a patent is invalid if it fails any of these 
criteria. 
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that invalidity does 
not turn on the patentee’s knowledge or state of mind.21 For example, Andy 
may very well believe himself to be the first inventor of the widget when 
filing the patent. However, it may emerge that an obscure book in a library 
in Bangladesh happens to depict the same widget. In this situation, the 
patent is invalid, even if Andy did not know of the book and had no 
meaningful ability to find it beforehand.22 The rationale for invalidity is 
simply that the widget is not in fact new and thus does not deserve a patent. 
Practically speaking, however, a finding of invalidity requires 
evidence. Unless and until someone finds the book in Bangladesh, we 
cannot know that the widget was not new. Thus, in processing a patent 
application, the PTO’s basic job (performed by an “examiner”) is to locate 
so-called “prior art”—evidence showing that the invention was previously 
known or is obvious, mainly by searching for prior books and journal 
articles showing the same widget.23 Similarly, the PTO examiner will be 
interested in information documenting whether the widget is operative and 
useful.24 The resulting procedure is that, unless the PTO finds information 
 
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006). 
20 See id. §§ 101–103. 
21 Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 190 (2011). 
22 See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding a single catalogued thesis in a 
German university library sufficient to invalidate a patent). 
23 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 704.01, at 700-4 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) 
(“After reading the specification and claims, the examiner searches the prior art.”). 
24 See id. § 2107, at 2100-24 to -25 (governing examination for utility). 
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(i.e., evidence) indicating that a patent is invalid, it will presume that the 
patent is valid.25 
It follows that the PTO will often erroneously issue a patent on the 
belief that it is valid, when in fact the patent is invalid. This does not 
necessarily require patentee dishonesty in suppressing information or 
hiding evidence. The world of prior art is very vast, and much of it is 
extremely obscure—a book in Bangladesh is inherently very hard to find. 
Invalid patents are frequently erroneously issued simply because the PTO 
lacks perfect information.26 
In order to correct such PTO errors, a defense of invalidity is available 
in litigation.27 That is, if Andy receives a patent (because the PTO did not 
find the book) and sues a defendant for patent infringement, the accused 
infringer will be able to argue that the invention is not really new, useful, or 
nonobvious, and that the PTO erred in issuing the patent. Again, it is 
important to note that the accused infringer does not need to prove that the 
patentee committed any dishonesty to prevail on the invalidity defense: all 
the accused infringer needs to do is find invalidating prior art such as the 
obscure book in Bangladesh. Accused infringers will often succeed where 
the PTO examiner failed because they have stronger incentives and more 
resources.28 If the book is now found and presented to a court, the patent 
will be declared invalid. A patent that is held invalid is treated as a legal 
nullity and has no further effect.29 
For clarity purposes, it is important to distinguish invalidity as an 
intrinsic property of the patent versus invalidity as an administrative or 
judicial holding based on available information. In this Article, when I refer 
to an invalid patent, I mean a patent covering an old, useless, or obvious 
invention, including a situation where no one knows the patent is really 
invalid. When I refer to a patent that has been invalidated or found (or 
declared, or held) invalid, I mean a patent where the defect in the invention 
has been discovered and presented to a tribunal such as the PTO or a court, 
so that the patent is declared to be a legal nullity with no further effect. 
 
25 See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he examiner bears the initial 
burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of 
unpatentability.”). 
26 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (46% of litigated patents are ultimately declared invalid by courts). 
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing defense of invalidity). Another mechanism to invalidate a 
patent after issuance is to seek reexamination in the PTO, which can revoke an issued patent if new 
information becomes available. See id. §§ 302–305 (providing for reexamination). 
28 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007). 
29 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a 
judgment of invalidity can be asserted by all future accused infringers against the patent). 
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2. Unenforceability for Inequitable Conduct.—As emphasized in the 
last section, an invalid patent may be issued without any dishonesty on the 
patentee’s part. An obscure book located in a Bangladesh library is hard to 
find, and unless it is found the PTO will issue the patent. There is no need 
for Andy to actively hide the book or to know of its existence. That said, 
what happens if—as is often the case—Andy discovers the old book 
depicting the widget while his patent application is pending? 
From a social point of view, the desirable outcome is for Andy to now 
disclose the book to the PTO examiner—if the PTO receives the book, it 
will deny the patent; and this denial will prevent an invalid patent from 
issuing, which is a social good.30 However, it is easy to see that Andy has a 
strong private incentive to do the exact opposite: not only will he not want 
to tell the PTO examiner about the book; he will want to further hide the 
book by throwing it into the ocean. The policy purpose underlying the 
inequitable conduct doctrine is to counteract this incentive for dishonesty 
and to encourage honest disclosure.31 
Procedurally speaking, inequitable conduct exists as a defense to 
patent infringement. When Andy sues someone for patent infringement, the 
accused infringer can argue that Andy committed dishonest (or 
“inequitable”) conduct before the PTO and that the patent should be held 
unenforceable. If the court finds that the patentee made a material 
misrepresentation or omission with intent to deceive, it will hold the 
patentee guilty of inequitable conduct. 32  Once liability for inequitable 
conduct is found, there is only one remedy: unenforceability of the patent.33 
Unenforceability means that the patent will be given no further effect.34 
In practical effect, an unenforceability judgment is basically identical 
to an invalidity judgment.35 The semantic distinction is useful—and will be 
maintained throughout this Article—because the two defenses seek to 
address different problems and have different triggers. The crux of 
invalidity is simply that the invention does not merit a patent. The crux of 
unenforceability from inequitable conduct is that the patentee has been 
dishonest, and the penalty seeks to punish and deter such dishonesty. 
 
30 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (describing the public interest in removing 
invalid patents). 
31 See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
32 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (listing the two requirements of materiality and intent and noting that “the standards for intent to 
deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time”). 
33 J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
34 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(noting that inequitable conduct cannot be cured by later action). 
35 There is one difference, which is that unenforceability renders an entire patent unenforceable 
while invalidity may affect only individual claims. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1561. I address the 
effect of this difference in Part I.E.1. 
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The unenforceability penalty is usually considered to be extremely 
severe and to produce a great deal of deterrence. The Federal Circuit calls it 
the “atomic bomb” of patent law.36 Scholars have called it a “death penalty” 
for patentees. 37  As the next section will show, however, this view is 
incorrect in at least some cases. In a case like Andy’s, the unenforceability 
penalty is not severe. Rather, it produces no punishment or deterrence at 
all. 
B. The Problem of Underdeterrence 
This section seeks to establish two points. First, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, the unenforceability penalty is not severe in one 
critical class of cases: cases where the patent is invalid. Rather, in such 
cases the punishment is so weak as to be nonexistent. Second, the 
culpability of the patentee is highest when a misstatement results in an 
invalid patent being erroneously issued by the PTO. The sum of these two 
points is a perverse result: in the cases with the highest culpability, the 
punishment and deterrence is weakest. To draw an analogy, it is like saying 
that murderers (the worst criminals) get the least prison time. 
Let us start with a definition of “culpability.” In fraud law, two factors 
are generally considered relevant to determine the culpability of a 
misrepresentation: materiality and intent.38 This comports quite well with 
common understandings of moral culpability: a misstatement that is 
material—that induces a bad consequence—is more culpable than a 
misstatement that has no effect. Similarly, intentional misstatements are 
usually regarded as more culpable than accidental mistakes. Beyond moral 
intuitions, economic analysis reaches the same result: generally speaking, 
economic analysis calls for greater punishment of intentional wrongs than 
accidental wrongs,39 and it calls for greater punishment of consequential 
wrongs than inconsequential ones.40 Standard inequitable conduct doctrine 
also defines patentee culpability by these two factors.41 
 
36 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
37 Cotropia, supra note 6, at 725; Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: 
Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (2009). 
38 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010) (defining securities fraud as 
making “a material misstatement with an intent to deceive” (emphasis omitted)). 
39 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 127, 135 (1981) (arguing that the transaction costs of avoiding intentional wrongs are 
lower than for accidental wrongs, therefore justifying supracompensatory damages as a deterrent). 
40 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1487 (1999) (“It is more important to deter billion-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence than 
million-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence.”). 
41 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287–88 (“[T]he standards for intent to deceive and materiality have 
fluctuated over time.”). 
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In the context of the inequitable conduct doctrine, dealing as it does 
with misstatements to the PTO, both of these factors correlate strongly to 
whether a patent is invalid under the true state of facts. As already 
mentioned, the basic job of the PTO is to ensure that old, useless, and 
obvious inventions do not get patents.42 A bad consequence is therefore by 
definition the erroneous issuance of such an invalid patent, and a patentee 
statement that induces this result is thus the most material type of 
misrepresentation. 43  On the intent prong, a patentee has the strongest 
motivation to make an intentional misrepresentation precisely when it will 
ensure that the PTO issues an invalid patent: if the information is 
inconsequential, then an applicant will have no motivation to lie about it, 
and thus immaterial misstatements are also unlikely to be intentionally 
made.44 
Therefore, for the purpose of this Article, I will define a “highly 
culpable” misstatement as one that results in the erroneous issuance of an 
invalid patent, that is, a patent that would be declared invalid if the truth 
were known. A “less culpable” misstatement is one that has no effect (i.e., 
the same patent would have issued anyway and is valid even if the truth 
were known). In using the terms “misrepresentation” or “misstatement,” I 
will include omissions of information. This is because every patentee 
makes the affirmative oath to the PTO that he believes himself to be the 
first and true inventor of a patentable invention.45 Concealing information 
showing the invention to be unpatentable makes this affirmative oath of 
true inventorship a misstatement. 
Now let us consider the effect of the unenforceability penalty. Return 
to the hypothetical patentee, Andy, who hides a prior art book that would 
prove his claimed invention is in fact not new. This is highly culpable 
misconduct under my definition, since it results in the erroneous issuance 
of an invalid patent—if the PTO examiner had been aware of the book, the 
patent would not be issued. As a policy matter, we would seek to impose a 
very severe penalty for this type of misconduct. Does the unenforceability 
remedy achieve this goal? 
The answer is “no.” It is important to understand that, in order for a 
claim of inequitable conduct to be properly alleged and proven, the accused 
infringer must have found the book. If the accused infringer does not find 
the book and discover its contents, then he will never know that Andy had 
 
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (requiring examination of applications based on these considerations). 
43 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (holding that, as a general matter, materiality means that at 
least one claim of the patent would be invalid if the truth were known to the PTO). 
44 There is one situation where materiality and intent diverge and where my definition will not 
precisely match our normal intuitions of culpability. Namely, an applicant may mistakenly believe that 
some piece of information proves his invention to be invalid and therefore intentionally hide it, even 
though the information is in fact harmless. I discuss this situation, which I call the “attempt” problem, 
in Part IV.B.2. 
45 § 115 (patentee oath). 
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hidden anything relevant to the patent—it is nobody’s business if Andy 
hides his personal reading habits—and so the accused infringer would have 
no foundation to litigate an inequitable conduct defense. But once the book 
is found, the patent will be declared invalid for lack of novelty, and the 
unenforceability penalty becomes superfluous. Whether the book is found 
or not, there is no punishment levied specifically for the dishonest behavior 
and therefore no incentive for honesty.46 
Another way of seeing this point is to consider Andy’s incentives at 
the time of deciding whether to disclose the book to the PTO. Andy’s 
calculus will go like this: If I disclose the book, the PTO will certainly deny 
my patent. Conversely, if I hide the book, then I will gain a patent unless 
and until I am caught, and even if I am caught the worst outcome is to lose 
the patent. Andy is therefore strictly better off to hide the book and gain the 
chance of evasion, as well as monopoly profits in the interim. 
Generalizing from this example, the more culpable the patentee’s 
dishonesty (i.e., the more likely that the patent is really invalid), the less ex 
ante deterrence the unenforceability penalty will provide against that 
misconduct. This is because an accused infringer must first discover the 
concealed information before he can prove a claim of inequitable conduct 
and apply the unenforceability remedy. Once the concealed information is 
exposed, however, a patent that was obtained through highly culpable 
fraud—i.e., by suppressing the damning information—is likely to be 
invalidated on its own merits. This renders the unenforceability penalty 
superfluous in precisely the worst types of cases. Too little punishment for 
serious dishonesty, in turn, means that serious dishonesty is more likely to 
occur in the PTO. 
The severity of this underdeterrence problem is made starker by 
comparing patents to any other government-issued entitlement, even 
entitlements created to incentivize and reward important social 
contributions. Imagine a nonveteran is discovered to have fraudulently 
claimed veterans’ benefits. It would be regarded as an obvious first step to 
terminate the further flow of benefits to that person,47  not as a drastic 
“atomic bomb” remedy to do so. It is also an obvious second step to require 
the fraudster to pay back all the previously received benefits.48 But in patent 
law the courts regard the analogous remedy—disgorgement of prior 
monopoly profits—as unimaginable, given that the termination of future 
 
46 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
181 & n.3 (Clarendon 1879) (1780) (arguing that a “punishment should be adjusted in such manner to 
each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender 
from giving birth to it” (emphasis added)). 
47 See 38 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006) (forfeiture of benefits for fraud). 
48 See id. § 6108 (authorizing courts to require restitution of fraudulently claimed benefits to the 
Department of Veterans Affairs). 
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monopoly profits is already an “atomic bomb.”49 Finally, in the veterans 
context, it would be an obvious third step to levy a real punishment on the 
fraudster, such as fines or prison, over and above terminating future 
benefits and requiring repayment of past benefits,50 but fines and prison are 
likewise considered unimaginably draconian measures in the patentee 
context. The fact that commonsense remedies in any other context are 
considered unimaginably draconian in patent law indicates that, far from 
being unduly harsh, the law of inequitable conduct is in fact unduly 
favorable to patentees. 
C. The Problem of Overdeterrence 
In contrast to Andy, let us consider a different patentee, Betty, who 
invents a pill that cures AIDS. This is plainly a new, useful, and 
nonobvious invention deserving a patent. However, in filling out the patent 
application, Betty makes a minor error: she misstates her citizenship as 
“China,” when she is in fact a citizen of Chile. What happens if Betty’s 
error is deemed to be inequitable conduct and her patent is thereby 
rendered unenforceable?51 
At the outset, it is immediately apparent that, in this context, the 
unenforceability penalty has a very large effect. In the absence of the error, 
Betty would still have a valid and valuable patent on the cure for AIDS. 
Rendering this patent unenforceable therefore deprives Betty of a large 
amount of value, akin to levying a gigantic fine. 
Not only is the punishment effect very large, the culpability of the 
“misconduct” that triggers it is very small. All Betty has done is to make an 
obvious typographical error. After all, Betty has no apparent motive to 
misstate her citizenship—a citizen of Chile gets the same patent rights as a 
citizen of China, on the same terms, and for the same duration. 52  The 
misstatement also causes no noticeable prejudice to the public or to the 
 
49 See Allison Pruitt, Note, Keeping Patent Applicants Honest: A Proposal to Apply Disgorgement 
Remedies to Findings of Inequitable Conduct During Patent Prosecution, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 465, 
487–88 (2006) (proposing such a remedy but acknowledging there is no present authority supporting it). 
50 See § 6102 (criminalizing fraudulently obtaining veterans benefits and prescribing fines for 
violations). 
51 One intuitive response might be that the error is so plainly trivial that no court would ever find 
Betty guilty of inequitable conduct. In Part III, I will discuss the effect of varying the standard for 
imposing liability in more detail. At present, however, the purpose of this section is to explore the effect 
of the unenforceability penalty if it is applied to a case like Betty’s precisely to show why such 
application is a bad idea. And it is at least plausible that Betty might be found guilty of inequitable 
conduct, since the statute specifically requires patent applicants to state their citizenship. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 115 (2006). 
52 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, done as revised July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property]. 
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PTO. In short, in the context of harmless errors, the unenforceability 
penalty exacts the strongest punishment for the least culpable offenses. 
The problem is not merely a matter of intrinsic unfairness, though that 
too is a concern. A more tangible problem is that such heavy punishment of 
trivial errors creates overdeterrence and inefficiently high levels of 
precaution.53 What will a patent applicant do in the future, upon seeing 
Betty’s example? The logical result would be to double- and triple-check 
the statement of citizenship, and all the other statements made in patent 
applications, for minor typos. This is a highly inefficient use of social 
resources: while typo-free patent applications might be a good thing in the 
abstract, having patent applicants spend millions of dollars in attorneys’ 
fees to ensure typo-free patent applications is not. 
The overdeterrence problem has been exhaustively described in the 
literature.54 The result of imposing severe punishment for minor mistakes is 
that patent applicants take excessive precautions against making them, such 
as by flooding the PTO with every tangentially relevant book and article 
and double- and triple-checking against typos and minor misstatements.55 
This is wasteful and increases the social cost of the patent system. 
D. A Model of the Over- and Underdeterrence Effects 
The above sections provide two extreme examples to demonstrate the 
upside-down effect: Andy hides information that would clearly invalidate 
his patent and receives zero punishment; Betty misstates information that 
has no bearing on the validity of her patent and receives severe punishment. 
Of course, patentee culpability is not truly a dichotomous on–off 
switch, but runs in degrees. Failing to disclose information to the PTO runs 
the gamut from “completely justified” (if the information is utterly 
irrelevant), to “likely excusable” (if the information is only tangentially 
relevant), to “dubious” (if the information is likely, but not certain, to 
invalidate the patent if known), to “damning” (if the information is certain 
to invalidate the patent if known). In other words, patent invalidity based 
on a particular reference is probabilistic,56 and some types of information 
 
53 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (2003). 
54 See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“[P]atent prosecutors regularly bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art references, most 
of which have marginal value.”); 154 CONG. REC. 22,629–30 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) 
(arguing that patent applicants “flood the Office with prior-art references but offer no explanation” as to 
their relevancy); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 770–73 (arguing that inequitable conduct results in 
overcompliance). 
55 Another harm that is often asserted is that applicants are deterred from explaining the materiality 
of references that they submit to the PTO. See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289. This is an illusory 
harm, however, in that patent applicants have no preexisting incentives to honestly identify material 
(i.e., damaging) references in the absence of inequitable conduct doctrine. 
56 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75–76 
(2005). 
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are more likely to be invalidating than others. The range of culpability 
accordingly varies. 
This means that the relationship between deterrence effects and 
culpability must consider the full spectrum of possible degrees of 
culpability. And it can quickly be seen that the inverse relationship persists 
for the entire spectrum: The more likely that a prior art reference is to 
invalidate the patent, the more culpable the patentee is in hiding it. At the 
same time, the more likely that a patent is invalid under the true state of 
facts (i.e., with the existence of the reference), the less punishment and ex 
ante deterrence the unenforceability penalty provides. This result is 
depicted in Figure 1. 


















In Figure 1, the dotted line represents the optimal relationship between 
culpability and punishment: generally speaking, from either an instrumental 
deterrence or a Kantian retributive justice perspective, we would like to see 
increasing punishment with increasing culpability. But, as Figure 1 
illustrates, the actual relationship (represented by the solid line) is exactly 
contrary. For the lowest culpability cases (Betty), there is the highest 
punishment, while for the highest culpability cases (Andy), there is the 
lowest punishment. 
The reason for this inverse relationship is the overlap between 
invalidity and unenforceability: As culpability increases, the patent 
becomes more likely to be invalidated if the truth is revealed. But as the 
patent becomes more likely to be invalidated, the unenforceability penalty 
has less deterrence effect. The result is an upside-down relationship 
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This inverse relationship results in two undesirable effects. On the left 
side of the diagram, we have overdeterrence, where minor misstatements 
not affecting the validity of the patent are strongly punished. Indeed, as the 
diagram shows, the clearer it is that a particular error is harmless (i.e., the 
further left we go), the stronger the overdeterrence effect becomes. 
Conversely, on the right side of the diagram we have underdeterrence, 
where patentees hiding highly damaging information are only lightly 
punished. And the clearer it is that a concealed piece of information would 
invalidate the patent if honestly disclosed (i.e., the further right we go), the 
worse the underdeterrence effect and the correspondingly perverse 
incentive to conceal. 
To be sure, the unenforceability penalty does achieve reasonably good 
results close to the center of the diagram. This represents a situation where 
the patentee both is somewhat culpable in failing to disclose a particular 
piece of information and is somewhat punished for this failure. But this 
narrow set of good outcomes is achieved at a heavy price: It both offends 
our moral sensibilities and creates highly perverse results when the most 
culpable fraudsters receive no punishment, the most innocent errors are 
subjected to the heaviest punishment, and only the intermediate cases are 
appropriately resolved. To consider an analogy, a criminal sentencing 
regime where murderers are let go and jaywalkers are executed would not 
be redeemed by giving robbers an appropriate prison sentence. 
E. Considering Objections to the Model 
1. The Effect of Entire-Patent Unenforceability.—One potential 
objection to the model above is that I have failed to consider the fact that 
inequitable conduct renders an entire patent unenforceable, while invalidity 
might only affect individual claims. To state this objection more clearly, an 
initial point to understand is that a patent can have multiple claims to 
somewhat different inventions; for example, a patentee may invent both a 
pencil and an eraser at the same time and thus have two claims: (1) to the 
pencil and (2) to the eraser.57 The patentee might subsequently discover 
prior art showing that pencils already existed in the public domain and 
intentionally hide this prior art to obtain the patent. Once the truth is 
exposed, only the pencil claim will be found invalid, but the inequitable 
conduct penalty will render the entire patent—including the otherwise-
valid eraser claim—unenforceable. 58  In this way, the unenforceability 
penalty will create some additional deterrence in cases where the patent is 
only partially invalid under the true state of facts. 
The response to the objection is that my model accounts for this 
phenomenon once we clarify the definition of culpability to account for the 
 
57 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (a patent may have “one or more claims”). 
58 See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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possibility of a patent being partially invalid. Straightforwardly, it is more 
culpable for a patentee to hide information that would wholly invalidate his 
patent instead of merely partially invalidating it; in our example, it would 
be more culpable for the patentee to hide prior art showing both a pencil 
and an eraser than merely to hide prior art showing only a pencil. Thus, 
when a patentee hides information that has a 100% chance of invalidating 
50% of the patent (and by this I mean 50% of its monopoly value, not the 
number of claims per se), this is just like a situation where a patentee hides 
information that has a 50% probability of invalidating the entire patent—he 
sits in the middle portion of the diagram, where he is somewhat culpable 
and somewhat punished. As Figure 1 shows, the more culpable the patentee 
is—the closer the information hidden comes to a 100% probability of 
invalidating all the claims in the patent—the less the punishment imposed. 
Therefore, the fundamental point of upside-down patentee incentives 
stands. 
2. The Potential for a “Smear” Effect on Invalidity Findings.—A 
second objection is that my model above relies on the independence 
between dishonest conduct and a judicial finding of invalidity, whereas in 
practice this might not strictly be the case. That is, a judge who hears about 
a patentee’s dishonesty might thereby become prejudiced against the 
patentee, and this might make the judge more likely to find the patent 
invalid rather than waiting to find it unenforceable.59 If committing highly 
culpable dishonesty not only makes a finding of inequitable conduct more 
likely but also makes a finding of invalidity more likely, then this would 
provide some additional deterrence against highly culpable misconduct. 
I have three responses to this objection. First, it obviously contradicts 
the formal doctrine: Invalidity is not supposed to depend on the patentee’s 
honesty or lack thereof—an old, useless, or obvious invention is invalid 
whether the patentee acted honestly or not.60 And the legal system usually 
tries very hard to make sure that decisionmakers are not prejudiced by 
formally irrelevant considerations.61 Thus, to the extent that judicial bias 
 
59 For obvious reasons of delicacy, this argument is often made in the form of imputing an 
improper motivation for accused infringers to allege inequitable conduct rather than attributing 
responsibility to the judge. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (arguing that “inequitable conduct has 
become a significant litigation strategy” because the allegations “cast a dark cloud over the patent’s 
validity and paint the patentee as a bad actor”). But the “dark cloud” would exist, and the strategy 
would be worthwhile, only to the extent that judges can be improperly influenced. 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
61 See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005) (“Decisions based on inadmissible 
evidence, or on admissible evidence used for an improper purpose, are illegitimate and violate 
principles of due process.” (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, the general assumption is that judges 
succeed in overcoming the temptation to consider irrelevant facts. See id. at 1255–56 (summarizing the 
conventional arguments that judges can overcome prejudice). But see id. at 1286–1322 (presenting 
experimental results that cast doubt on this). 
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can ameliorate the underdeterrence effect I have identified, it is a case of 
two wrongs offsetting each other. It would be a strange defense of the 
conventional wisdom indeed for someone to argue that the problem I 
identify is “solved” by the possibility of judicial prejudice. 
Second, to the extent that an increased chance of invalidity might 
produce deterrence, it is the invalidity judgment that is doing all the work, 
not the unenforceability penalty. Thus, the conventional wisdom about the 
unenforceability penalty—that it is a uniformly draconian sanction that 
deters patentees from all misconduct big and small—is still wrong. And the 
model in Figure 1, which concerns the incentives produced by the 
unenforceability penalty, is still correct, even if there is now another factor 
that ameliorates the underdeterrence effect (and so the practical 
consequences are not as dire). 
Third, the possibility of improper judicial bias in finding invalidity 
ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the upside-down effect. At the 
extremes, patentees still have upside-down incentives, and in equal 
magnitude. A patentee such as Andy already knows he has a 100% chance 
of the patent being found invalid if the truth is ever discovered, even 
without the judge being biased against him. The result is that Andy’s 
incentives are completely unchanged by the possibility that a judge finding 
out about his dishonesty might become biased against him—the judge 
cannot become more likely to invalidate the patent. Andy still has 
everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by hiding the damaging information 
because the payoff to dishonesty comes from the possibility of evading 
detection. Thus, although there will be less over- and underdeterrence for 
cases of intermediate culpability (i.e., in the middle portion of the diagram), 
at the extremes—where the most serious problem lies in the first place—
the basic problem remains. 
F. The Difference from the Conventional Wisdom 
The sum of my analysis above is that inequitable conduct produces 
both underdeterrence and overdeterrence. This contrasts sharply from the 
conventional wisdom, which usually views the problem solely as one of 
overdeterrence.62  Thus, the unenforceability penalty is referred to as an 
“atomic bomb” or a “death penalty,” 63  while the inequitable conduct 
defense has been called an “absolute plague.”64  Common proposals for 
reform are aimed exclusively at reducing the punishment and deterrence 
 
62 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6 (arguing that inequitable conduct causes overdisclosure); 
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 735, 778 (2011) (“[U]ncertainties in the operation of existing doctrine may induce risk-averse 
agents to overdisclose . . . .”). 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
64 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
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effect of inequitable conduct, such as by raising the standards of intent and 
materiality, 65  raising the burden of proof, 66  reducing the penalty by 
rendering unenforceable only certain claims of a patent (rather than the 
patent in its entirety),67 and implementing a one-sided cost-shifting regime 
where accused infringers that raise an inequitable conduct defense and lose 
would have to pay attorneys’ fees to victorious patentees.68 
A skeptical reader might be concerned that I have overstated the 
degree of consensus in the conventional wisdom. After all, the recent case 
of Therasense, which quite severely narrowed the inequitable conduct 
doctrine, nonetheless also produced a dissent by Judge Bryson that three 
other judges joined. At first blush, this would suggest that there is a 
contrary view being voiced, albeit by a minority of judges. Even a cursory 
reading of the dissenting opinion, however, dashes any hopes on this front. 
Here is how the dissent begins: 
 There is broad consensus that the law of inequitable conduct is in an 
unsatisfactory state and needs adjustment. . . . In litigation, counterclaims of 
inequitable conduct have been raised in too many cases and have proved 
difficult to resolve. In the PTO, . . . inequitable conduct has led some patent 
prosecutors to err on the side of “overdisclosure” in order to avoid the risk of 
rendering all claims of an otherwise valid patent unenforceable . . . .69 
The dissent then states its core disagreement with the majority: 
[T]he majority’s new test . . . does not merely reform the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it altogether. I 
respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision.70 
Judge Bryson’s dissent does not exactly give voice to the 
underdeterrence problems of inequitable conduct doctrine. Rather, it brings 
to mind the old joke that a conservative judge believes there is no 
meritorious habeas petition in a thousand, while a liberal judge believes 
there is one. The difference between the majority and the dissent in 
Therasense is only that the majority believes that inequitable conduct 
claims are always frivolous and draconian and wants to abolish the defense 
de facto, while the dissent believes that inequitable conduct allegations are 
merely almost always frivolous and would not go as far as abolition. The 
 
65 See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 6 (proposing to raise standards of intent and materiality); David 
O. Taylor, Patent Fraud, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 73–80 (2010) (arguing for higher intent and materiality 
standards). 
66 See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring 
heightened pleading, including pleading intent with particularity). 
67 See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–75; Dolak, supra note 17, at 30–31. 
68 See, e.g., Dolak, supra note 17, at 31; Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to 
Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 172 (2006). 
69 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Bryson, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 1304 (emphasis added). 
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consensus among all the judges is that inequitable conduct allegations are 
“raised in too many cases” and that the threat of unenforceability leads to 
“overdisclosure” to the PTO. The same view is shared by almost all 
members of the patent community, as a quick look at the amicus lineup in 
Therasense reveals.71 The fact that even the dissenters start off by joining 
this “broad consensus” forcefully demonstrates the lopsided nature of the 
conventional wisdom. 
II. UPSIDE-DOWN INCENTIVES FOR ACCUSED INFRINGERS 
As shown in Part I, the unenforceability penalty produces both over- 
and underdeterrence. It produces overdeterrence in cases of low culpability 
and underdeterrence in cases of high culpability. Despite this effect, the 
common perception of the penalty invariably focuses on its potential 
overdeterrence effect. Even the dissenters concede this point at a 
fundamental level and only quibble at the edges. If my analysis is right, 
then why does no one worry—or at least worry very much—about the 
underdeterrence problem? 
One potential answer, suggested in Part I, is that the conventional 
wisdom has simply failed to consider the marginal effect, as opposed to the 
overall result, of unenforceability. That is, holding a patent unenforceable 
sounds at first blush to be very severe—until one considers that the patent 
might be invalid anyway, a point that is easy to miss.72 And much of the 
reason for the conventional wisdom can probably be attributed to this 
phenomenon. 
This Part provides a second, complementary answer. Judges and 
commentators rarely consider the possibility of underdeterrence, which 
arises in the relatively more culpable cases of patentee dishonesty (the right 
side of Figure 1), because they believe that such highly culpable patentee 
dishonesty almost never occurs in the PTO.73 My argument in this Part is 
that this belief in intrinsic patentee honesty arises because of a litigation 
selection effect and is therefore based on an illusion. As section A will 
demonstrate, the more culpable the patentee’s misconduct, the less likely it 
is that an accused infringer will bring such misconduct to light by mounting 
an inequitable conduct defense. The effect of this selection effect on 
 
71 See id. at 1289, 1294 (majority opinion) (noting wide support for narrowing doctrine). 
72 Cf. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 
786–87 (1999) (describing, in the environmental protection context, how legal analysis often fails to 
consider marginal effects). In a different context of patent law, Mark Lemley has noted the need to 
isolate the marginal effect of the remedy in the context of patent misuse because the patent misuse 
remedy frequently overlaps with antitrust remedies. See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic 
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1615–18 (1990). 
73 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 11 & n.72 (2003) (“Hearing testimony generally indicated that, 
so far as it goes, the duty of candor induces substantial compliance,” even though “noncompliance 
penalties are rare.”); see also infra text accompanying note 100. 
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perceptions about patentee honesty and corresponding judicial (and 
legislative) beliefs about the need for an inequitable conduct doctrine to 
deter dishonesty are explored in sections B and C. 
A. The Selection of Defenses in Litigation 
Consider two accused infringers facing two different lawsuits by two 
different patentees. In Lawsuit A, the accused infringer discovers that the 
patentee had misstated information to the PTO, and the information is 
sufficient to invalidate the patent. For example, the accused infringer 
discovers an old book depicting the invention and thereby showing that the 
patentee’s invention is not new. In Lawsuit B, the accused infringer 
discovers that the patentee had misstated something that does not really 
affect the validity of the patent, such as making a typo in the patentee’s 
address. What should each accused infringer do? 
In Lawsuit A, the accused infringer will immediately file a summary 
judgment motion for the invalidity of the patent. Importantly, the basis of 
the summary judgment motion will not be that the patentee lied to the PTO 
and is guilty of inequitable conduct—at this point the accused infringer 
may suspect this to be the case but has no concrete evidence. Rather than 
investigate the patentee’s knowledge and intent, it is far easier to simply 
submit the (now discovered) critical document showing that the invention 
is not new and the patent is invalid for lack of novelty. At this point the 
case will end, since the patent is now invalidated and void.74 No evidence 
of patentee dishonesty will ever be located, let alone presented to a court. 
There is little incentive for an accused infringer to undertake the 
additional task of discovering evidence and then proving in court that the 
patent applicant intentionally misled the PTO, which is required to show 
inequitable conduct but not to establish invalidity. First, collecting evidence 
showing that the patentee had knowledge of the omitted information is 
difficult enough. Second, even after it is established that the patentee knew 
about the book and did not submit it to the PTO, the patentee will certainly 
still claim that it was an inadvertent mistake rather than intentional fraud—
that he simply forgot to submit the book or that he believed the book was 
not relevant. Proving the patentee’s true intent in the face of such self-
serving litigation denials is almost impossible because the Federal Circuit 
has erected a very high standard of proof.75 Finally, and most importantly, 
there is very little benefit to the accused infringer in undertaking these 
 
74 See Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (dismissing 
the inequitable conduct issue as moot in light of invalidity); see also Joovy LLC v. Target Corp., 437 F. 
App’x 932, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (accused infringer voluntarily waiving inequitable conduct claim upon 
finding of invalidity). 
75 Specifically, as described in Part II.C.1, the Federal Circuit holds that a patentee’s knowing 
suppression of invalidating prior art is not evidence of intent to deceive the PTO. See Optium Corp. v. 
Emcore Corp., 603 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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costly burdens. Even if the accused infringer succeeds, the only thing he 
gains is a judgment of unenforceability, which is superfluous in light of the 
judgment of invalidity. Because proving patentee intent is all work for no 
gain, a rational accused infringer in Lawsuit A will focus on invalidity and 
ignore inequitable conduct. 
This is a slight simplification, in the sense that there is one small 
benefit for an accused infringer to prove inequitable conduct, over and 
above the remedy for proving the invalidity of the entire patent.76 A finding 
of inequitable conduct opens the possibility of—but does not mandate—an 
award of attorneys’ fees.77 But this is a minor issue in comparison to the 
much higher stakes of winning the overall case—even the conventional 
wisdom has always treated attorneys’ fees as small potatoes.78 The sum is 
that invalidity is far easier to prove than inequitable conduct, for almost the 
same result, and so in a world of limited litigation resources,79 an accused 
infringer who has a strong invalidity defense will devote most of his 
resources to invalidity and treat inequitable conduct as, at most, an 
afterthought. 80  Perhaps, due to an abundance of caution, the accused 
infringer will not completely ignore the inequitable conduct charge, but he 
will devote less attention to it. Notably, this effect occurs even without 
considering the possibility of settlement, which would reduce the incentive 
for litigation even further.81 
The picture flips 180 degrees when we consider Lawsuit B, where the 
accused infringer does not have a reasonable invalidity argument, since the 
patent applicant’s address does not affect whether the invention is new, 
useful, or nonobvious. Now the accused infringer has every incentive to 
emphasize the patentee’s misstatement to the patent office and play up the 
inequitable conduct defense,82 spending a great deal of his brief on this 
 
76 Another benefit of unenforceability comes into play when the patent is only partially invalid, 
where there is some incentive for an accused infringer to litigate inequitable conduct in order to render 
the entire patent unenforceable. See supra Part I.E.1. But in those cases, the patentee’s culpability is 
also lessened, since the patent is only partly undeserved, and this again demonstrates the upside-down 
effect that accused infringers have more incentive to litigate precisely when the patentee’s culpability is 
lower. 
77 See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
78 See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that whether the patent would 
be held unenforceable when the asserted claims were already invalidated “would really be of secondary 
importance”). 
79 This is especially the case when invalidity and inequitable conduct are competing for the same 
scarce litigation resources. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) (imposing word limit on briefs). Arguing 
inequitable conduct then detracts from the all-important invalidity argument. 
80 See infra Part IV.C.4 for more discussion of the inadequacy of attorneys’ fees as a solution to the 
upside-down effects. 
81 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting a model where litigation occurs only when parties fail to settle). 
82 For example, the accused infringer would probably argue that the misstatement is “intentional” 
since the patentee must have known his own address and is “material” because getting the right address 
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issue. This is, to be sure, a very weak argument for the accused infringer. 
But it is stronger than all of his alternatives. The adage “beggars can’t be 
choosers” applies. 
This upside-down selection effect explains a phenomenon that courts 
have long observed, which is that accused infringers devote enormous 
amounts of resources to litigating obviously weak inequitable conduct 
cases.83 Judges are often mystified by this phenomenon and emerge with 
the conclusion that accused infringers have extremely zealous lawyers.84 
The same judges then engage in this reasoning: If accused infringers will so 
zealously litigate even a weak inequitable conduct case involving trivial 
mistakes, then they would surely even more zealously litigate a strong 
inequitable conduct case involving real patentee misconduct, and the fact 
that I almost never see any such strong inequitable conduct cases therefore 
tells me that such serious misconduct does not actually happen.85 Courts 
therefore emerge with a strong belief in intrinsic patentee honesty.86 
The basic point of this section is that courts are correct in observing 
that accused infringers will zealously litigate many weak inequitable 
conduct cases. But they are wrong to believe that just because someone will 
zealously litigate a weak inequitable conduct case, the same person would 
zealously litigate a strong inequitable conduct case, and therefore are also 
wrong to draw the inference that the lack of strong cases in litigation is 
because such strong cases do not exist. Rather, the counterintuitive result 
shown by my analysis is that accused infringers will zealously litigate weak 
inequitable conduct cases but will treat strong ones as afterthoughts. 
One criticism of my analysis will likely be that it must be wrong in 
positing that strong inequitable conduct cases are neglected because 
virtually every accused infringer alleges inequitable conduct in their 
pleadings.87  It is true enough that inequitable conduct is almost always 
 
on a patent is oh-so-important for the public interest. Of course, these are extremely weak arguments. 
But that is the point of the selection effect. 
83 See, e.g., Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(observing that “every patentee’s imperfections were promoted to ‘inequitable conduct’” by accused 
infringers); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Reputable 
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest 
grounds . . . .”). 
84 See, e.g., Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (speculating that accused infringers’ lawyers “make the 
charge against other reputable lawyers . . . to represent their client’s interests adequately, perhaps”). 
85 See id. (“They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases.”); see 
also Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the 
Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 161–62 (2005) (explicitly arguing that the low win rate for 
accused infringers is “indicative of the rare circumstances in which patentees blatantly engaged in 
inequitable conduct”). 
86 Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (calling allegations of inequitable conduct “an absolute plague”). 
87 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“The habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute 
plague.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422)). 
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alleged, but this actually reinforces my point. The costs for accused 
infringers arise when the accused infringer seeks to prove inequitable 
conduct with concrete evidence but do not arise in simply alleging it. It is 
costly to pay lawyers and detectives to dig up reliable evidence of patentee 
dishonesty, and it consumes valuable briefing space and limited trial 
presentation time to contest the issue. But it is almost costless to include a 
pro forma allegation, since there are no word limits for pleadings and the 
attorneys’ fees required are minimal.88 
The result is that virtually every accused infringer—including those 
with strong cases—will allege inequitable conduct in their pleadings.89 At 
the same time, the defense is rarely seriously pursued: inequitable conduct 
defenses are litigated to a conclusion in only 16% to 35% of reported 
cases.90 Thus, as the litigation process proceeds—and as the cost of actually 
collecting evidence and presenting the argument to judges increases—a 
large majority of inequitable conduct allegations are left to wither while 
other defenses are pursued instead. This reinforces the illusion of patentee 
honesty because, in the conventional wisdom, the fact that an allegation of 
inequitable conduct is made but then abandoned is taken to indicate its 
frivolousness.91 My analysis, however, suggests that accused infringers will 
abandon (or, at most, only halfheartedly pursue) many strong inequitable 
conduct cases involving serious misconduct because in those cases the 
invalidity defense is more promising and there is little further to gain by 
pursuing the inequitable conduct defense. 
B. The Effect on Judicial Perceptions 
What happens over the long run when judges see only weak 
inequitable conduct cases being litigated and never strong cases? As a great 
 
88 The only cost is potential sanctions for making frivolous allegations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. This 
cost has not been significant because Rule 11 has not traditionally been seriously enforced. See S. REP. 
NO. 104-98, at 13–14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692–93 (noting that Rule 11 
motions are expensive to file and courts are hesitant to impose sanctions even when violations are 
proved). The Federal Circuit has recently begun to take pleading requirements for inequitable conduct 
more seriously. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. Whether this new standard has or will 
reduce the number of allegations—and whether the effect will fall on the frivolous or meritorious 
allegations—has not been well studied. 
89 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
90 Mack, supra note 68, at 155–56; Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard 
in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 607–08 (2009) (reporting that 
inequitable conduct was addressed, on average, in 20% of reported patent cases from 2000 to 2007). 
91 See Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (noting that accused infringers “get anywhere with the 
accusation in but a small percentage of the cases” and therefore labeling the allegations as an “absolute 
plague”); see also Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 24 (2007) [hereinafter Patent Reform Hearing] (statement of Kathryn L. 
Biberstein, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Chief Compliance Officer, 
Alkermes, Inc.) (“I do not believe that inequitable conduct is an issue in patent prosecution today 
because it is rarely found to exist.”). 
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deal of literature has shown—and as common sense would indicate—they 
start believing that serious patentee misconduct never really occurs, merely 
because they do not see such misconduct in the cases before them.92 This is 
known as “availability bias,” where people overestimate the statistical 
frequency of events that they have vivid knowledge of and underestimate 
those that they do not.93 The perception of widespread patentee honesty will 
therefore arise even if serious patentee misconduct is in fact rampant. And 
once judges start believing that true patentee misconduct rarely occurs, they 
then change doctrine to cut back the inequitable conduct defense.94 
The doctrinal reaction has a further effect: making inequitable conduct 
claims even harder to prove makes accused infringers with reasonable 
invalidity defenses devote even fewer resources to the inequitable conduct 
argument because the burden is now higher and the expected reward is 
even less. For accused infringers with no other options, the adage that 
beggars can’t be choosers still applies, so they will still make the 
inequitable conduct argument. Thus, a vicious cycle begins where courts 
now see even more pathetically weak cases by desperate accused infringers 
and even fewer meritorious cases. Judges think that real patentee 
misconduct occurs even less frequently than before, making them narrow 
the doctrine even further. The cycle then continuously repeats. 
I should make clear that, in arguing that there is no evidence to justify 
the belief in intrinsic patentee honesty, I have no empirical evidence 
demonstrating the opposite. That is, I cannot demonstrate that patentee 
dishonesty is in fact rampant in the PTO, besides the fact that there is an 
obvious incentive for patentees to use fraud to obtain undeserved patents 
and the fact that there is no punishment levied for such fraud once we 
consider overlap with invalidity. My more limited point is that a great deal 
of doctrinal narrowing has been enacted (and even more proposed) based 
on the unsubstantiated belief in patentee honesty, which is in turn based on 
 
92 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 893–99 (2006); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 
1124, 1127–28 (1974). 
93 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 207–08. 
94 A similar phenomenon occurs in Fourth Amendment litigation under the exclusionary rule. As 
Nancy Leong has discussed, the only people who are likely to invoke the exclusionary rule are clearly 
guilty criminal defendants who are trying to exclude the very evidence that demonstrates their guilt. See 
Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 434–35 (2012); see also Christopher Slobogin, Why 
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403–04 (“[U]nder the 
exclusionary regime, the Fourth Amendment is virtually always associated with a criminal; only people 
who have been found in possession of evidence of a crime seek exclusion.”). This means the most 
common type of Fourth Amendment challenge to police conduct involves a search that yields 
incriminating evidence, and judges rarely encounter an abusive search that violates citizen privacy 
without yielding any evidence. The result is that judges start to believe that abusive searches are rare, 
and they narrow the Fourth Amendment as a result. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) (“In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its 
luster and become associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities.”). 
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faulty inferences from litigation win rates. 95  The only clear point that 
litigation evidence—tainted by the selection effect—supplies is that serious 
patentee dishonesty at least sometimes occurs.96 Despite the extremely high 
burden of proof and the lack of incentives to litigate the issue in high 
culpability cases, claims of inequitable conduct do occasionally succeed, 
and in the vast majority of those successful cases the patent is also 
invalidated.97 This means that there are at least some cases where patentees 
have obtained undeserved patents through fraud—and where they have 
received no punishment even after being caught. 
C. Matching Theory to Empirics: The Universal Unpopularity of 
Inequitable Conduct 
Because of the perception created by the litigation selection effect, the 
inequitable conduct doctrine is almost universally unpopular, and it is 
unpopular for the specific reason that it is believed to produce draconian 
overdeterrence against innocent patentees (i.e., not because people believe 
it produces insufficient deterrence against fraudulent patentees). This is 
reflected by the fact that all three branches of government have taken 
action to narrow its applicability. This section will examine each branch 
separately. 
1. The Federal Circuit: Narrowing Doctrine.—As mentioned 
already, the Federal Circuit has not hesitated to use strong language to 
condemn the inequitable conduct doctrine. This is because its judges 
believe that patentees are in fact almost never dishonest to the PTO and that 
the doctrine serves little purpose beyond harming innocent patent owners 
and providing windfalls to evil infringers. Thus, the Federal Circuit calls 
allegations of inequitable conduct “an absolute plague,”98 and considers the 
unenforceability remedy an “atomic bomb” that should rarely, if ever, be 
deployed.99 And, reflecting their belief that serious patentee misconduct 
basically never happens, the same judges regularly state that allegations of 
patentee dishonesty are “overplayed” and generally frivolous.100 
 
95 See infra Parts II.C.1 (judicial changes) and II.C.3 (legislative changes). 
96 See, e.g., Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 830 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s findings that a patent applicant fabricated evidence to deceive 
the PTO). 
97 Wasserman, supra note 12, at 23. Paradoxically, Wasserman views this as a reason to narrow the 
inequitable conduct doctrine. See id. 
98 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
99 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, 
J., dissenting)). 
100 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Kimberly–Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 
1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 
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Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit carries these sentiments into its 
doctrine, so that inequitable conduct has an extraordinarily high burden of 
proof. As the authors of a recent empirical study summarize their findings, 
the Federal Circuit’s “[i]nequitable conduct jurisprudence evinces a strong 
preference for patentee success.”101 A comparison to other types of fraud 
illustrates how this incredibly onerous burden of proof works. 
First, the Federal Circuit has imposed extremely severe pleading 
requirements. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires 
allegations of fraud to be pleaded with specificity, the rule also provides 
that the intent element may be pleaded without specificity.102 The Federal 
Circuit, however, requires intent to deceive to be pleaded with specificity to 
show that nefarious intent, rather than innocent mistake, is the single most 
reasonable inference on the facts pleaded. 103  This heightened pleading 
standard is the most onerous in all of civil litigation. As a striking 
comparison, this single-most-plausible-inference standard is the precise 
standard that the Supreme Court rejected for allegations of securities 
fraud,104 even after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) had specifically enacted a requirement of heightened pleading for 
intent.105 The PSLRA pleading standard is usually understood as the most 
onerous pleading requirement that Congress could imagine, 106  yet the 
Federal Circuit’s pleading standard for inequitable conduct exceeds it. 
Second, on the merits, the Federal Circuit imposes a high burden of 
proof, requiring inequitable conduct to be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.107 The court has imposed this high burden of proof explicitly for 
 
2012) (describing inequitable conduct allegations as a “toss-in”); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. 
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422. 
101 Petherbridge et al., supra note 16. 
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.”). 
103 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
Although there is some language in Exergen Corp. v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 n.5 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), suggesting that the pleading standard is lower, the more recent decision in Pressure 
Products Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010), makes clear that 
inequitable conduct cannot be even asserted (i.e., pleaded) unless the Star Scientific standard is met. See 
id. at 1320 (“[T]his court has . . . requir[ed] specific and demanding showings of evidence before a 
party may assert the defense of inequitable conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
104 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (“The inference that 
the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable . . . or even the ‘most plausible of competing 
inferences . . . .’” (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004))). 
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2006). 
106 See Kevin S. Shmelzer, Comment, The Door Slammed Shut Needs to Be Reopened: Examining 
the Pleading Requirements Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 
424 (2005) (“Congress . . . created a standard which was the highest of the highs . . . .”). 
107 See Tol–O–Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt–Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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policy reasons: it believes that unmeritorious allegations of inequitable 
conduct are too easily made.108 It has imposed this heightened burden of 
proof even though it lies in great tension with the terms of the patent 
statute: § 282 of the patent statute requires that a patent be presumed 
valid, 109  while making no mention of a patent being presumed to be 
enforceable (and the statute clearly views invalidity and unenforceability as 
distinct defenses).110 Under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
the express statutory creation of a heightened burden of proof for invalidity 
would implicitly preclude a heightened burden of proof for all other 
defenses enumerated under § 282. 111  The Federal Circuit has never 
explained how its heightened burden of proof is reconcilable with the 
expressio unius canon and the Supreme Court’s closely analogous holding 
in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit that the express enumeration of heightened pleading for fraud and 
mistake in Rule 9(b) implicitly precludes heightened pleading for all other 
types of actions.112 
Third, beyond imposing a high formal threshold at both the pleading 
and merits stages, the Federal Circuit also makes it extremely difficult to 
meet these elevated thresholds in practice. Not only does the Federal 
Circuit formally require an extremely strong inference of intent, it 
disallows the most commonsensical method of providing such an inference 
in practice. A consideration of how intent is usually proved in other fraud 
contexts helps explain this. Suppose that a taxpayer is accused of 
committing fraudulent tax evasion by intentionally failing to file tax 
returns. The IRS proves that the taxpayer always files tax returns in the 
years where he has a refund and never files tax returns (or pays taxes) in 
the years where he owes a tax liability. 
In theory, even on this evidence, it is still possible that the taxpayer 
could have innocently forgotten to file tax returns and that the convenient 
timing is a simple coincidence. In every situation where intent is at issue, 
there is always the classic problem: Was the perpetrator a knave or a fool? 
 
108 Id. (“Given the ease with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be portrayed as 
intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support an 
inference of culpable intent is required.” (citing N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 
(Fed. Cir. 1990))). In fairness to the Federal Circuit, there is some doctrinal support for its heightened 
burden of proof. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 240–41 (1897) (requiring clear 
and convincing evidence when the government revokes a patent for fraud). But the Federal Circuit has 
not cited American Bell to support its heightened burden of proof, and in any case, it is arguably 
superseded by the statute. 
109 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011) (holding that § 282 
imposes a heightened standard of proof for invalidity). 
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing that a patent “shall be presumed valid” and then creating 
separate defenses of unenforceability in subsection (1) and invalidity in subsection (2)). 
111 See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 
(1993). 
112 See id. 
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It is impossible to conclusively establish that the omission was not an 
innocent mistake, and our hypothetical taxpayer will surely file a self-
serving affidavit during litigation, asserting that he innocently forgot to file 
and the timing was a simple coincidence. Nonetheless, any reasonable 
person will immediately draw the inference that the taxpayer intentionally 
failed to file because he failed to file only when there was something for 
him to gain (i.e., avoiding the tax liability). This type of inference is both 
commonsensical and common in ordinary evidence law.113 
In the inequitable conduct context, however, the Federal Circuit holds 
that the obvious materiality of the information concealed cannot be used to 
draw an inference that the concealment was intentional.114 In other words, 
the fact that the patentee concealed extremely damaging information—
material information that would clearly invalidate the patent—while 
providing information that is either helpful to his cause or at least 
harmless115 is considered irrelevant to determining intent.116 By this logic, 
whether a taxpayer owes any taxes cannot be considered in determining 
whether he intentionally failed to file a tax return, and whether a witness 
has a stake in the outcome of a case cannot be considered in determining 
whether he deliberately lied (perjury) or merely made an unintentional 
misstatement. This is also notably inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of intent in other areas of patent law. For example, charges of 
intentional infringement (which produces treble damages) are routinely 
proven using the presumption that an infringer who knew about the patent 
and clearly infringes it presumably intended the infringement,117 and so 
 
113 See, e.g., Bradford v. Comm’r, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that intent to commit 
tax fraud can be inferred from: “(1) understatement of income; (2) inadequate records; (3) failure to file 
tax returns; (4) implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior; (5) concealing assets; [or] (6) 
failure to cooperate with tax authorities” (citations omitted)). 
114 Optium Corp. v. Emcore Corp., 603 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Materiality is not 
evidence of intent, which must be established as a separate factual element of a discretionary ruling of 
inequitable conduct.” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
115 The patentee always provides information helpful to his cause because the patent application 
necessarily asserts the invention to be new, useful, and nonobvious. § 115 (describing the oath an 
inventor must make). 
116 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“Proving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have known of its materiality, and 
decided not to submit it to the PTO does not prove specific intent to deceive.”). Prior cases that seemed 
to take a contrary position, such as Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services, 
Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]ntent to deceive is generally inferred from . . . a 
knowing failure to disclose material information.”), have been overruled by the en banc decision in 
Therasense. 
117 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (willful 
infringement requires the patentee to “demonstrate that th[e] objectively-defined risk . . . was either 
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer” (emphasis added)); DSU 
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (specific intent to induce 
infringement can be proven by “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and 
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intentional infringement would be found even if the infringer files a self-
serving affidavit stating that he honestly believed himself to be 
noninfringing. 118  In short, the Federal Circuit’s absurd evidentiary 
limitation, unique to cases of inequitable conduct, removes the most 
important type of evidence normally used to draw inferences of intent—the 
fact that the person has a strong motive to lie because the lie will do him 
some good—and makes intent to deceive practically impossible to prove 
without an explicit patentee confession.119 
My point in this section is not to criticize the Federal Circuit for its 
doctrinal twisting; that has been done elsewhere.120 Rather, the point is that 
such doctrinal twisting is motivated by a belief among judges that “real” 
patentee misconduct basically never occurs.121 Given the lengths to which 
the Federal Circuit has gone to hollow out inequitable conduct—which it 
cannot openly abolish because of Supreme Court precedent122—the judicial 
belief in patentee honesty is strong indeed. 
2. The PTO: Declining Enforcement.—Although the PTO is the 
supposed beneficiary of the inequitable conduct doctrine, the agency has 
shown little support for it. The PTO has not conducted investigations of 
inequitable conduct for more than twenty years. 123  More strikingly, the 
Director of the PTO has stated that the inequitable conduct doctrine “is not 
very popular” and that he hoped that courts would “dramatically draw[] it 
back.”124 Similarly, in 2007, the then-Director of the PTO testified before 
Congress that inequitable conduct “unfairly punish[ed]” patent applicants 
 
that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements” (quoting Manville 
Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1990))). 
118 See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting an infringer’s 
argument that it honestly believed the advice of lawyers that it was not infringing the patent). 
119 Cf. Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing 
with approval a prior case “finding intent to deceive based in part on handwritten notes of prosecution 
counsel [showing] that counsel subjectively believed the undisclosed patent was material”). 
120 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 13, at 962–64. 
121 See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (“[T]his court has tried to address the proliferation of 
inequitable conduct charges by raising the intent standard alone.”); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (creating an elevated standard of proof because 
of concern about “strik[ing] down an entire patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or 
acted with minimal culpability or in good faith”). 
122 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) 
(establishing the inequitable conduct defense). 
123 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.03[4][b][iv] & n.66, at 11-403 (2012) 
(describing how the PTO stopped enforcement of the inequitable conduct doctrine in 1988); 1095 Off. 
Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 12, 16–17 (1988) (statement of Donald Quigg, Assistant Secretary and 
Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks). 
124 DIRS. ROUNDTABLE INST., A DIALOGUE WITH DAVID KAPPOS, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE 34 (2011), available at http://www.directorsroundtable.com/pdf/London%20
Patent%20Program%204-4-11.pdf (statement of David Kappos, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office). 
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with a “draconian penalt[y]” and recommended significant legislative 
narrowing of the doctrine.125 
By itself, the fact that the PTO does not enforce the doctrine would not 
indicate much. The PTO lacks the institutional resources to investigate 
patentee conduct and adjudicate inequitable conduct issues.126 After all, the 
entire reason for requiring patentees to disclose prior art to the PTO is 
because the agency lacks adequate resources to find all of the relevant prior 
art by itself. It is inherently more difficult to find out about—and prove—
cases where patentees had intentionally hidden the prior art at issue. As a 
matter of sensible institutional allocation of responsibility, it would make 
little sense for the PTO to investigate inequitable conduct cases: someone 
who has already been fooled once is not the best person to prevent a repeat. 
At the same time, the fact that the supposed beneficiary of the doctrine 
has shown so little support—and in fact hoped that the doctrine would be 
“dramatically” scaled back and narrowed—is indicative of the 
overwhelming unpopularity of the inequitable conduct doctrine. And as the 
Federal Circuit has dramatically narrowed the doctrine over the years, the 
PTO has shown strong support every step of the way.127 
One last, perhaps obvious, point: The fact that the PTO does nothing 
to investigate inequitable conduct defeats the argument that it should be 
relatively immune to the selection effect and cognitive illusion that I have 
described. If the PTO investigated instances of inequitable conduct, it 
might then become aware of cases of serious patentee misconduct that were 
not brought to the attention of courts by accused infringers during 
litigation. However, because the PTO performs no investigation, it cannot 
become aware of patentee frauds even if such frauds were rampant—it 
must rely on the same tainted public data (i.e., litigation decisions) as 
everyone else. 
3. Congress: Creating Loopholes.—The belief that litigated 
inequitable conduct cases are always frivolous—and that this is because 
true patentee misconduct never occurs—affects not only the judges of the 
Federal Circuit but also other members of the patent community who see 
the same data set as the judges.128 This includes members of Congress. 
 
125 Patent Reform Hearing, supra note 91, at 266–67 (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary 
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office). 
126 See Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321, 37,323 (proposed Aug. 6, 1991) (codified in 
scattered sections of 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10). 
127 See, e.g., Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (endorsing the Therasense materiality standard); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (“The Office does not advocate any change to the Kingsdown ruling.”). 
128 See, e.g., Patent Reform Hearing, supra note 91 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein, Senior 
Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Chief Compliance Officer, Alkermes, Inc.) (“I do not 
believe that inequitable conduct is an issue in patent prosecution today because it is rarely found to 
exist.”). 
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Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, has made comments that epitomize the 
conventional view: 
As you well know, the inequitable-conduct defense is frequently pled, rarely 
proven, and always drives up the cost of litigation. 
 Under current law, any perceived transgression of the patent owner is 
being painted as fraud. If an inequitable-conduct claim wins, a valid patent 
will be held entirely void, and the infringer walks away without any liability. 
 There is virtually no downside for the infringer to raise this type of attack. 
This is why inequitable-conduct challenges are raised in nearly every patent 
case. It has become, in the words of the Federal Circuit, a “plague” on the 
patent system.129 
Senator Hatch’s assumptions are wrong in many respects. The result 
of inequitable conduct is not always that a “valid” patent is held entirely 
void—tellingly, he appears to assume that no invalid patents are ever 
obtained through patentee fraud. And an infringer faces the same 
“downsides” to raising an inequitable conduct defense as to raise any other 
defense, such as invalidity or noninfringement: it requires attorneys’ fees 
and litigation costs to seriously litigate any defense to patent infringement, 
and the investigatory costs are especially high when the patentee has 
intentionally concealed relevant evidence. Finally, Senator Hatch’s 
observation that inequitable conduct is “frequently pled” while “rarely 
proven” invokes the common argument that allegations of patentee 
dishonesty are generally frivolous.130 Contrary to this implicit argument, 
however, my analysis suggests that this phenomenon may in fact indicate 
that many meritorious inequitable conduct cases are being abandoned 
precisely because the fraud is so serious that the patent is invalid. 
Again, my point here is not to pick on Senator Hatch’s comments as 
wrong but to show that they represent the conventional wisdom, which has 
arisen because of the selection effect. The clear assumption underlying his 
remarks is that Senator Hatch believes patentees are never (or at least very 
rarely) dishonest enough to obtain invalid patents by fraud. Given this 
erroneous but widely shared premise, it logically follows that inequitable 
conduct doctrine serves no other purpose than to allow evil infringers to 
“walk[] away without any liability” while punishing innocent and worthy 
patentees.131 
Belief in this conventional wisdom amongst members of Congress has 
led to legislation to narrow the inequitable conduct doctrine. Section 12 of 
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act creates a new “supplemental 
 
129 Hatch, supra note 5, at 515–16 (footnotes omitted). 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 83–91. 
131 Hatch, supra note 5, at 516; cf. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (criticizing the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as saying “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered”). 
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examination” procedure, where a patent owner may—at any time after the 
patent is issued—ask the PTO to conduct a supplemental examination of 
the patent to consider information that was previously concealed from the 
PTO. 132  The Act then provides that “[a] patent shall not be held 
unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to information that had not 
been considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect in a prior 
examination of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered, 
or corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.”133 As one 
commentator has described, this amounts to an “amnesty” program for 
dishonest patentees: So long as a patentee invokes the supplemental 
examination procedure and confesses to a prior deception, the prior 
deception is unconditionally forgiven and cannot thereafter form the basis 
of an inequitable conduct charge.134 
The statute does have two limitations on the amnesty. First, the 
amnesty does not apply to any patentee-initiated suits that are launched 
before the conclusion of supplemental examination proceedings.135 In other 
words, if a patent owner seeks the protection of the amnesty, he must wait 
for the supplemental examination to conclude before filing an infringement 
suit. Second, the amnesty does not apply to inequitable conduct allegations 
that are fully pleaded before the filing of a supplemental examination 
request. 136  That is, a patentee cannot wait and seek the supplemental 
examination amnesty only after the writing is on the wall; he must do so 
(slightly) earlier.137 
But these are minor qualifications. The more important point is that, as 
a general matter, the new legislation destroys any incentive for patentees to 
honestly disclose information upfront.138 In Part I.E.1, I discussed the fact 
that, in the middle portion of the figure—where a patent is only partially 
invalid—there is some deterrence effect from rendering the entire patent 
unenforceable. Under the new legislation, even this limited deterrence 
effect is eliminated. Suppose our patentee who claims a pencil and an 
 
132 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284, 325–26 
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013)). 
133 Id. 125 Stat. at 326. 
134 See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (calling the 
provision “a patent amnesty program”). 
135 § 12, 125 Stat. at 326 (codified at 35 U.S.C.A § 257(c)(2)). 
136 Id. 
137 The statute requires an inequitable conduct charge to be “pled with particularity” before it 
forecloses a supplemental examination amnesty. Id. Given the Federal Circuit’s very high pleading 
burden, see supra text accompanying notes 102–06, a fully pleaded inequitable conduct charge can be 
aptly said to be writing on the wall. 
138 See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 134, at 25–26 (explaining that the two qualifications 
“are largely within the control of the patentee, and thus are not likely to offer an effective 
counterincentive”). 
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eraser discovers prior art showing a pencil in the public domain. 
Previously, a risk averse patentee might disclose the prior art pencil to 
avoid losing the valid claim to the eraser. Now, however, there is no 
incentive to disclose the prior art pencil unless and until its discovery by a 
third party is imminent.139 The new legislation therefore exacerbates the 
underdeterrence problem. Once again, the universal unpopularity of 
inequitable conduct—based on the unsubstantiated belief in intrinsic 
patentee honesty—leads to doctrinal changes that create an incentive for 
dishonesty. 
III. THE EFFECT OF ADJUSTING LIABILITY STANDARDS 
Thus far, my analysis has considered only the effect of the 
unenforceability penalty, with the implicit assumption that it would always 
be applied. One seemingly obvious response is that surely the 
unenforceability penalty would not be applied to the low-culpability cases. 
This response jumps the gun in the sense that the reason that the penalty 
should not be applied in low-culpability cases is that it induces 
overdeterrence, and to reach this conclusion first requires a consideration of 
what would happen if the penalty were applied. Moreover, the response is 
not quite accurate. In the conventional debate over inequitable conduct, the 
most commonly contested issue is the standard for liability, i.e., the degree 
of culpability that should be required before the unenforceability penalty 
attaches. This Part explores the effects of varying the liability standard. As 
shall be seen, the results are quite different from the conventional 
understanding. 
A. The Debate over Liability Standards 
In the conventional debate over inequitable conduct, there is a 
common theory on the relationship between liability standards and 
deterrence effects. Specifically, the theory is that narrow liability produces 
low deterrence, and broad liability produces high deterrence. This theory is 
implicit in virtually all writing about inequitable conduct. 
For example, as described previously, there is an almost universal 
belief in the patent community that inequitable conduct produces 
overdeterrence. Reflecting the common theory, there is then a broad 
consensus in the patent community that liability standards should be 
narrowed. Both the majority and the dissent in Therasense agreed that 
inequitable conduct should be narrowed from the prior baseline. The 
majority, believing inequitable conduct to produce overdeterrence, adopted 
 
139 Id. One other limitation on invoking supplemental examination is the PTO fee for the 
procedure. Although it is quite large in absolute terms ($16,500), the sum is nonetheless trivial in 
comparison to the increased value of an undeserved patent and to the patentee’s other litigation costs. 
See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4232 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. § 1.20) (setting fee for supplemental examination). 
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a very narrow liability rule. Specifically, it held that inequitable conduct 
could be found only if honest disclosure would have invalidated the 
patent.140 This is known as the “but-for” standard and it is usually regarded 
as the most stringent standard possible.141 
The dissent’s position was that the majority narrowed liability too far, 
to the point where inequitable conduct would now produce 
underdeterrence: 
[T]he majority’s new test . . . does not merely reform the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it altogether. I 
respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision. 
 . . . . 
 . . . If a failure to disclose constitutes inequitable conduct only when a 
proper disclosure would result in rejection of a claim, there will be little 
incentive for applicants to be candid with the PTO, because in most 
instances the sanction of inequitable conduct will apply only if the claims 
that issue are invalid anyway.142 
This is, at first blush, rather similar to my analysis in Part I. But it is 
different in two ways. First, the dissent believed the problem arose from the 
majority narrowing liability too much, whereas Part I shows that the 
underdeterrence effect occurs even with absolute liability.143 Second, the 
dissent accordingly believed that underdeterrence can be prevented or 
cured by adopting a broader liability rule—specifically, it advocated a rule 
where inequitable conduct could be found if a patentee violates PTO 
disclosure requirements, even if the concealed information is harmless and 
the patent is valid. But, as this Part will show, this is the wrong solution. 
Expanding liability does not cure the underdeterrence problem. The 
common theory about the relationship between liability standards and 
deterrence effects is wrong, or at least is overly simplistic. 
The following discussion will demonstrate this counterintuitive 
proposition in more detail. To state the reason quickly, however, lowering 
the liability standard (i.e., broadening liability) and levying the 
unenforceability penalty on relatively innocent patentees will not provide 
deterrence for the highly culpable patentees because a highly culpable 
patentee like Andy already knows he will be found 100% liable if the true 
facts are ever discovered. He still has no incentive for honest disclosure 
because even certain liability brings no deterrence when the 
 
140 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (defining the standard as: “the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the 
undisclosed prior art”). 
141 See Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and Recommended 
Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 854 n.65 (1999). 
142 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1304–05 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
143 See supra note 51 (noting that the model assumes liability is found). 
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unenforceability “penalty” is superfluous. All the Therasense dissenters’ 
solution would do is create more examples of draconian overpunishment on 
people like Betty, which would spark even more criticism and calls for 
abolishing the inequitable conduct doctrine entirely. 144  In this way, the 
dissenters’ “solution” is self-defeating. 
B. A Model of Unenforceability with Liability Thresholds 
As discussed in Part I.D, if the unenforceability penalty is applied in 
all cases, then the result is an upside-down punishment structure. This can 
be conceptualized as the lowest (and broadest) liability standard—in every 
case the patentee is found liable for inequitable conduct. Figure 1, which 
shows the basic model, is reproduced below. For clarity, I have added 
shading to represent the over- and underdeterrence effects. 


















As described previously, the upside-down nature of the 
unenforceability penalty creates two problems: on the left side of the 
diagram, there is overdeterrence, while on the right side of the diagram, 
there is underdeterrence. Both effects get more pronounced as we go 
towards the extremes. The result is that patentees conceal the most 
damaging information (because of underdeterrence), while they massively 
overdisclose the most trivial information (because of overdeterrence). 
 
144 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
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Imposing a liability threshold means that cases with lower culpability 
(left of the threshold) incur no penalty. Figure 2 illustrates the effect this 
has on the over- and underdeterrence problems: 


















As can be seen, the liability threshold removes most of the 
overdeterrence effect seen in Figure 1. The underdeterrence effect on the 
right side of the diagram remains. Perhaps more counterintuitively, there is 
now an underdeterrence effect on the left side of the diagram. 
What this represents is patent applicants taking too few precautions 
against minor errors. For example, a rule that says misspelled citizenship 
will never be punished means that applicants have no incentive to check 
their citizenship statements. Although this is better than imposing 
draconian overpunishment and having applicants take grossly excessive 
precautions against such minor errors, having patent applicants take no 
precautions at all is still a social cost—patent applications riddled with 
typos and other minor mistakes are still undesirable. Thus, in Figure 2, 
there is an area of underdeterrence, but this area is smaller than the area of 
overdeterrence seen in Figure 1 (in both cases I am speaking only of the 
left side of the diagram). 
Now consider the right side of Figure 2. This represents the cases 
where the patent is likely invalid—at the extreme, it is a case like Andy’s. 
And it represents the problem the dissenters in Therasense identified. The 
dissenters then argued that expanding liability will solve this problem. To 
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As can be seen, the right portion of the diagram, representing patentees 
who hide highly damaging, likely invalidating information from the PTO, 
is utterly unaffected by lowering the liability threshold. Thus, contrary to 
the common intuitive belief, expanding inequitable conduct liability does 
not increase deterrence against highly culpable fraud on the PTO. A highly 
culpable patentee is underdeterred not because he expects to escape 
liability, but because the penalty is insufficient even when liability is 
imposed. Expanding liability thus does not fix the problem. 
The only effect of lowering the liability standard is to change the left-
middle portion of the diagram, where we switch from underdeterrence to 
overdeterrence. Most strikingly, the point where the liability rule is initially 
satisfied (the sharp spike) now produces a great deal of overdeterrence. 
This would represent a case similar to Betty’s—a fairly minor error (e.g., 
misstated citizenship) that almost certainly would not invalidate the patent 
even if revealed, but that a court might deem a violation of statutory 
disclosure requirements.145 Imposing the unenforceability penalty in such a 
case exacerbates the upside-down effect, since it creates severe 
overdeterrence without reducing the worst cases of underdeterrence on the 
right side of the diagram. In this way, the dissenters’ solution is both wrong 
and self-defeating: It does nothing to solve the problem it seeks to solve, it 
creates additional problems, and those additional problems generate 
backlash against the rule by falling on highly visible and politically 
sympathetic victims. 
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What about the Therasense majority, which wants to narrow liability? 
Raising the liability threshold would simply take us back to Figure 2, which 
reduces the overdeterrence effect but does not address the underdeterrence 
problem. This is in one sense better (compared to Figure 3 and Figure 1), 
but it is still distinctly subpar as a solution. Furthermore, raising the 
liability threshold too far can be highly problematic. Beyond the center 
point of the diagram, there is no overdeterrence effect to reduce, and thus it 
becomes purely an increase in underdeterrence with no offsetting benefit.146 
The big problem with the conventional focus on liability thresholds is 
that the right half of the diagram always has underdeterrence. No matter 
what rule we set for the liability threshold, a patentee like Andy will always 
be better off lying to the PTO. The only effect of varying the liability 
threshold is to affect incentives on the left side of the diagram. This is not 
trivial—the liability rule still matters—but it is an incomplete solution. 
Unless there is some reason to believe high-culpability cases simply do not 
occur,147 then the conventional focus on liability rules ignores half of the 
problem. A proper solution to the underdeterrence problem requires 
adjusting the remedy,148 a solution I will discuss in more detail in Part IV. 
C. Expanding the Model with Probabilistic Liability 
An objection to the model in section B might be that a liability 
threshold is too simplistic. Implicit in that model is an assumption that 
courts determine culpability with a great deal of consistency: If a patentee 
falls above the threshold, even by a tiny amount, the patent will be held 
unenforceable in every such case, while if a patentee falls below the 
threshold, no penalty will be applied. In real life, courts are not so 
consistent.149 However, expanding the model does not greatly change the 
analysis. 
Rather than imposing a bright-line threshold, a more realistic model 
would be to suppose that the chance of being found liable increases with 
the culpability but is never quite 0% or 100%. That is, an innocent patentee 
like Betty is unlikely to be found liable but still has some chance due to the 
 
146 There is, in theory, an “optimal” liability threshold where the marginal overdeterrence effect 
equals the marginal underdeterrence effect. My point is therefore not that the liability rule has no effect, 
nor that narrow liability is always better. My point is that reforming the liability rule is a highly 
incomplete solution, with the best result still having significant over- and underdeterrence effects. 
147 To be sure, many judges and commentators do in fact believe that high-culpability cases never 
occur, which may explain why the debate has focused on the liability rule. But Part II explains why this 
assumption is unfounded. 
148 Contra Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing for expanding liability as the solution); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 
F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (same). 
149 See Thomas L. Irving et al., The Evolution of Intent: A Review of Patent Law Cases Invoking 
the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 319–20 
(2010) (arguing that inequitable conduct liability determinations are “panel-dependent”). 
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vagaries of the trial process. Similarly, a patentee like Andy is very likely 
to be found liable, but the chance is not 100%, again because of the 
vagaries of the trial process. Figure 4 depicts how this assumption—of a 
variable chance of being found liable—affects the result: 


















In Figure 4, the probability of being found liable for inequitable 
conduct increases in a straight line with increasing culpability. The patentee 
with no culpability has a 10% chance of being found liable, while the 
patentee with the highest culpability has a 90% chance of being found 
liable, with intermediately culpable patentees having correspondingly 
intermediate chances of being found liable (e.g., a patentee that is 60% 
culpable has a 58% chance of being found liable). 
Two things are notable about this model. First, the right-hand side is 
once again completely unaffected—it still shows a severe and pervasive 
underdeterrence problem. The better news, however, is that the left side is 
reasonably efficient: there is a reasonable correlation where increasing 
culpability results in increasing deterrence, though still with some over- 
and underdeterrence effects. This reasonably good outcome arises because 
the high severity of the penalty is being offset by the low probability of 
being found liable. For example, although a 5% culpable patentee would 
face a very severe penalty (losing a 95% valid patent), that relatively 
innocent patentee only faces a 14% chance of liability and thus is only 
slightly overdeterred. 
What Figure 4 suggests is that if we can adjust the probability of being 
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possible to achieve optimal deterrence on the left side of the diagram. 
Figure 5 illustrates this possibility: 


















This is the best outcome that can be achieved through manipulation of 
the liability rule. On the left half of the diagram, the overdeterrence effect 
is exactly offset by manipulating the probability of being found liable, 
resulting in the perfect amount of deterrence. However, once we pass the 
center point, even a 100% chance of liability—which is not achievable in 
reality because we can never eliminate the possibility of evasion—will not 
result in sufficient deterrence because the declining severity of punishment 
dominates the deterrence effect. In other words, beyond the center point, it 
becomes quite likely that the patent is invalid anyway, so the prospect of a 
meaningless superfluous penalty ceases to be a sufficient threat. The sum 
of the situation is that, even with perfect calibration of the liability rule, the 
underdeterrence problem cannot be solved. This is the same whether we 
adopt a simplistic liability threshold or a more sophisticated probabilistic 
liability rule. 
Moreover, it should be noted that actually implementing the type of 
probabilistic calibration contemplated by Figure 5 would be extremely 
demanding on courts. In order to achieve the optimal result, courts must be 
able to determine the amount of culpability and the severity of the 
punishment with a high degree of precision; they must then manipulate the 
probability of finding liability (including not only the win rate in cases 
actually brought to litigation but also the probability of having litigation in 
the first place) to exactly offset the severe punishment. Achieving this 
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where the severity of the punishment (when imposed) is very high and thus 
even slight changes in the probability of imposing such punishment will 
have large effects. Not only is achieving such precision difficult, it also 
offends a basic moral premise of our legal system that similar cases should 
receive similar outcomes.150 For example, in Figure 5, a relatively innocent 
patentee with 5% culpability will receive very severe punishment when 
liability is imposed, and therefore courts must impose such liability only 
very occasionally (to be precise, 5.263% of the time). This is equivalent to 
saying that one unlucky patentee out of approximately twenty similarly 
situated patentees must get randomly zapped by a harsh penalty to provide 
optimal deterrence to others—a situation that is difficult to design 
administratively and not all that desirable from a moral viewpoint even if it 
were feasible.151 If this perfect probabilistic liability rule cannot realistically 
be achieved, then existing reform efforts that are focused on tinkering with 
the liability standard have even lower payoffs than the incomplete solution 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ADJUSTING REMEDIES 
A. Generalizing the Problem: The Paradox of Fraud 
Before proceeding to my proposed solution, it is useful to note that the 
problem analyzed here is not unique to patent law. The core problem 
underlying the inequitable conduct doctrine can be termed the “paradox of 
fraud”: by the time a fraud charge can be litigated, the previously concealed 
truth will necessarily have been exposed, and once the truth is exposed 
there will usually be an independent legal remedy that provides full 
restitution.152 A consideration of how other areas of law deal with this same 
problem illuminates why the inequitable conduct solution has thus far 
proven a failure. 
Take contract law. Suppose a builder contracts with a homeowner to 
build a house using Reading pipes.153 The builder’s employee inadvertently 
substitutes cheaper Cohoes pipes, which creates a breach of the contract. 
Once the builder discovers this error, however, the builder decides to lie 
 
150 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982) 
(“[T]he most basic principle of jurisprudence [is] that ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’” 
(quoting Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.))). 
151 Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that 
randomly imposing punishment is impermissible “in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual”). 
152 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.15 (7th ed. 2007) (“If a tort is 
concealed . . . , punitive damages or a criminal penalty must be added to the defendant’s profit or the 
victim’s loss to provide adequate deterrence.”). 
153 This hypothetical is based on Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
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and tell the homeowner that he installed Reading pipes rather than to 
disclose the truth and pay the difference in value. 
It is immediately apparent that the fraud paradox applies here as well: 
By the time the homeowner discovers that the pipes are really Cohoes 
pipes, he can sue the builder for breach of contract. The contract remedy is 
fully restitutionary—that is, it places the homeowner in the same position 
as if the builder had fully complied with his legal duty in the first place.154 
If the fraud remedy were also merely restitutionary, it would be superfluous 
and provide no deterrent against the builder choosing to lie after he 
discovers the employee’s inadvertent error.155 But clearly there is social 
value in deterring the cover-up lie over and above the initial breach of 
contract. It is for this reason that fraud allows punitive damages,156 whereas 
breach of contract is only restitutionary. 157  The potential for punitive 
damages creates deterrence over and above the breach of contract claim, 
solving the fraud paradox. 
In comparison to contract law’s solution to the fraud paradox, patent 
law falls short on three fronts. First, the invalidity remedy is not fully 
restitutionary in the way that a breach of contract remedy is. That is, ex 
post judicial invalidation does not place a patentee who obtained an invalid 
patent in the same position as if the patent never issued because the 
patentee is not required to disgorge monopoly profits made during the 
period between the patent’s issuance and its judicial invalidation.158 Nor 
does a finding of inequitable conduct and the application of the 
unenforceability remedy have this effect. The result is that applicants have 
a strong incentive to apply for patents regardless of the underlying merits 
of their inventions because any mistake by the PTO will accrue to the 
applicant’s benefit in the form of interim monopoly profits. As another 
comparison, imagine a doctrine that said any mistaken interim payments by 
the Social Security Administration were the recipient’s to keep, even after 
the mistake is discovered, and the only effect of discovery is to terminate 
future undeserved payments. The result would surely be a flood of 
undeserving applications—some outright fraudulent; some merely hoping 
 
154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a), at 102 (1981) (purpose of contract 
remedies is to put the victim “in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed”). 
155 Cf. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527–28 (1970) 
(“If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”). 
156 See POSNER, supra note 152; see, e.g., Etter v. Von Sternberg, 244 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. App. 
1951) (affirming punitive damages against a party that fraudulently concealed a breach of contract). 
157 See generally 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.2, at 550 (rev. ed. 2005) 
(“As a general rule, punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract . . . .”); see also id. at 
552 (noting that in cases “falling within the field of tort,” such as for fraud, there is an exception to the 
general rule that damages should be merely restitutionary). 
158 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 19, 28. 
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for a bigger payday than deserved—all hoping for such “lucky” mistakes.159 
Not surprisingly, there is in fact a flood of dubious patent applications,160 
which are often analogized to lottery tickets,161 and which clog the PTO.162 
At a minimum, therefore, a sensible reform for patent doctrine would be to 
make the default invalidity remedy fully restitutionary, even in the absence 
of intentional concealment.163 
Second, the unenforceability remedy does not create marginal 
deterrence in the same manner as punitive damages. Punitive damages 
create marginal punishment and deterrence in that they go beyond the 
remedy for breach of contract and place the dishonest builder in a worse 
position than if he had been honest initially. This creates an incentive for 
the builder to be honest upon discovery of the initial inadvertent error (of 
the employee using Cohoes pipes). The super-restitutionary remedy also 
creates an incentive for the homeowner to bring the intentional fraud to 
light even after prevailing on a strict liability breach of contract claim in 
order to gain the punitive damages. 164  In contrast, the unenforceability 
remedy is superfluous in light of the invalidity remedy, which means there 
is no additional punishment for dishonesty and little incentive for an 
accused infringer to bring the fraud to light afterwards. The obvious 
solution in light of this comparison is to ensure that the inequitable conduct 
remedy provides something over and above the invalidity remedy so that a 
dishonest patentee is placed in a worse position than if he had been honest 
upfront. 
The third difference is that, as described in Part II.C.1, an accused 
infringer who seeks to prove inequitable conduct in patent litigation faces a 
far higher burden than an ordinary plaintiff seeking to prove fraud in 
contract litigation. This point is somewhat tangential to the point of this 
Article because, as demonstrated in Part III, changing the liability standard 
 
159 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2006) (provision for Social Security Administration to recover mistaken 
overpayments). 
160 See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 318–21 (describing a “patent quality crisis”); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, exec. summ., at 5 (stating that low quality patents “[a]re a [s]ignificant 
[c]ompetitive [c]oncern”). 
161 See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the 
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 149–51 (2008). 
162 See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 987, 1065 (2003) (“[T]here have been dramatic increases in the number of patent 
applications in recent years . . . .”). 
163 Another way of thinking about this is that a patentee who obtained an invalid patent has 
breached his contract with society, since he did not in fact supply a new, useful, and nonobvious 
invention as promised. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 
(1989) (analogizing patents to a “bargain”). Society should then be entitled to rescission, including a 
disgorgement of interim payments. 
164 See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) 
(noting that one reason for awarding punitive damages is to provide an incentive to sue). 
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will not fundamentally solve the upside-down-incentives problem, and a 
better solution is to fix the remedy. But a liability standard that is so high 
that inequitable conduct is de facto impossible to prove will still present a 
problem, since no remedy will suffice to deter misconduct if the penalty is 
never applied. The Federal Circuit is not yet at the point of literally never 
finding inequitable conduct to be proven, but it comes sufficiently close to 
this extreme that it is a concern worth raising.165 
B. Punitive Fines as a Solution 
The usual solution to the fraud problem is some kind of punitive 
sanction. As shown previously, the unenforceability remedy does not work 
as a punitive sanction because its interaction with invalidity produces 
upside-down marginal deterrence. A much more direct solution is to 
abandon the unenforceability remedy and impose direct monetary fines 
instead.166 Because inequitable conduct and the unenforceability remedy are 
both judge-made doctrines, this requires only a small doctrinal change—
small, at least, in comparison to abolishing inequitable conduct altogether, 
as is often proposed.167 And although I call this monetary penalty a “fine”—
which usually denotes something paid to the government—it is important 
that this fine be made at least partly payable to the accused infringer in 
order to provide an incentive for accused infringers to litigate the issue.168 
In advocating the abolition of the unenforceability remedy, I do not 
mean to endorse a moral proposition that highly culpable patentees who 
fraudulently obtain invalid patents from the PTO ought to be able to 
enforce those patents, so long as they pay the proposed fine. That is neither 
the motivation nor the likely effect of my proposal. Rather, the reason I 
advocate abolishing the unenforceability penalty is that it is superfluous in 
cases of highly culpable patentee misconduct—the patent would already be 
invalidated when the truth came to light. The point of a punitive remedy is 
to punish the dishonesty by imposing punishment over and above the result 
that would occur but for the dishonest conduct. The failure to impose this 
additional loss is what makes the unenforceability remedy a failure as a 
solution to the fraud paradox. 
 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. Since its decision in Therasense, the Federal 
Circuit has issued only one published decision upholding a finding of inequitable conduct. Aventis 
Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding patent both invalid and 
unenforceable). 
166 But cf. Cotropia, supra note 6, at 775 (considering a monetary fine but arguing that unenforceability 
produces better tailoring). 
167 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144; Lynch, supra note 
7, at 9. 
168 Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (2006) (providing between 15% and 30% of the recovery to 
private plaintiffs as an incentive to expose fraudulent claims). 
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Conversely, it should also be noted that, in cases where some 
misstatement occurs but the patent is not otherwise invalid (the left side of 
the diagram), a small fine can and should be assessed even while leaving 
the patentee with a valid and enforceable patent. This is  
because even minor errors should receive some deterrence169—just not the 
disproportionate penalty of losing an otherwise valid patent. 
The key question is how the fine should be calculated. There is a vast 
law and economics literature on setting the right amount of punitive fines 
and damages.170 In short, a remedy for misconduct should do two things: 
(1) impose restitution by restoring the world to the state it would have been 
in if the misconduct had not occurred and (2) punish the misconduct by 
placing the wrongdoer in a worse state than what would have been, in 
proportion to the ex ante likelihood of evasion, to deter future incentives 
for misconduct.171 
1. The Baseline: Restoring the “But for” State.—The typical starting 
point for legal remedies is to restore the world to where it would have been 
had the misconduct not occurred.172 One might think that the invalidity 
remedy—by invalidating an erroneously issued patent while maintaining a 
properly valid patent—would suffice for this purpose. And indeed, the 
invalidity remedy does fulfill part of this function. However, it fails to do 
so completely because the invalidity remedy does not require patentee 
disgorgement of interim monopoly profits.173 
Where a patentee misstatement causes a wholly invalid patent to 
issue—which in a but-for world would never have issued—a proper 
restitutionary remedy must remove all the future and past effects of the 
patent. The fact that the patent would be independently invalidated once the 
truth comes to light does remove the future effects of the patent, so no 
further action is needed on that front. However, in order to redress the past 
effect of the patent, a disgorgement remedy is required.174 Thus, just as in 
other fraud contexts, a patentee who obtained an invalid patent through 
fraud should be required to repay all the ill-gotten monopoly profits made 
during the interim.175 
Where a patentee misstatement causes a partially invalid patent to 
issue, the analysis is largely the same. The fact that the patent would be 
 
169 See supra Figure 2. 
170 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). 
171 See id. at 887–89. 
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4), at 203 (2011) 
(“The object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing . . . .”). 
173 See Lemley, supra note 158. 
174 See Pruitt, supra note 49 (arguing for disgorgement remedy). 
175 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4), at 203 (“[T]he 
unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer . . . is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong.”). 
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partially invalidated removes the future effect of the excessive scope 
received. A disgorgement remedy should also be imposed for the excess 
profits made over and above what a properly issued patent would have 
earned. To be sure, assessing the difference between the actual monopoly 
profits gained under the improperly enlarged patent vis-à-vis the 
hypothetical monopoly profits that would have been earned under a 
properly issued patent may be difficult as a practical matter—I will discuss 
the assessment problem in Part IV.C.1—but conceptually the baseline is 
quite clear. 
Where a patentee misstatement does not cause an invalid patent to 
issue but causes some other benefit to the patentee (e.g., allows the patentee 
to pay lower PTO fees), the result is that the patent should not be 
invalidated.176 Rather, a restoration of the but-for state would simply entail 
removing the benefit, such as by paying the PTO fee at the proper rate (plus 
interest). 
Most obviously, where a patentee misstatement had no effect at all, 
this prong of the test would have no application. A somewhat tricky 
problem, which I will address in the next prong, deals with attempts at 
fraud that prove immaterial ex post, but which might nonetheless need 
some deterrence ex ante. 
2. The Punishment: Accounting for the Chance of Evasion.—Even 
after applying a restitutionary remedy, there would be insufficient 
deterrence of fraud. If the remedy were limited to restitution, the patentee 
would reason thus: “If I am dishonest and succeed, I will gain a benefit, 
while if I fail, I would only be placed in the same position as if I were 
honest to begin with, and so I am strictly better off being dishonest.”177 
What is needed is a punishment that offsets this expected gain (in cases 
where evasion is successful) with an expected loss (in cases where the 
wrongdoer is caught).178 
For example, if a dishonest patentee has a 75% chance of evading 
detection and expects to gain $100 in those cases where he is not caught, 
then in the 25% of cases where he is caught, he must be made to pay a 
punitive fine of $300 in addition to disgorging the $100 gain. This achieves 
 
176 Cf. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230–32 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding a patent 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct in falsely claiming small-entity status). 
177 Patent courts are acutely sensitive to this problem when the victim is a patentee and the 
wrongdoer is an infringer. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 
(6th Cir. 1978) (opining that infringement damages must be more than restitutionary since otherwise an 
“infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain”); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 
1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (endorsing Panduit). Yet they are mysteriously blind to it when the 
alignment is reversed. 
178 See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If a tortfeasor is 
‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as 
heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.”). 
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optimal ex ante deterrence because the total expected gain from dishonesty, 
after accounting for the deterrence value of punishment, is zero. Stated 
algebraically: 
0)1(  FpGp ee  
where 
  pe is the probability of evading detection and liability, 
  G is the anticipated gain in cases where evasion is successful, and 
  F is the amount of punitive fine required. 
Reworking the equation produces this formula for calculating the fine: 
 
 
Applied to the example above, pe would equal 0.75, (1 – pe) would equal 
0.25, and G would equal $100, resulting in an F of $300. 
As a general approximation, the value of the anticipated gain in cases 
of successful evasion (G) can be proxied by the actual gain of the patentee. 
If the patentee in fact received an invalid patent worth $100 through his 
fraud, then it can usually be assumed that $100 was what he anticipated. 
This is because, over the long run, patentee expectations would be formed 
based on actual results.179 In the usual case, therefore, courts should assess 
the fine by taking the value of the ill-gotten patent (or the ill-gotten portion 
of a partially invalid patent), and multiplying that value by an appropriate 
multiplier to account for the chance of evasion. 
The one complication is situations where the patentee’s anticipated 
gain clearly differs from the actual gain. For example, a patentee may 
mistakenly believe his pending patent to be invalid and thereby use 
deceptive tactics to obtain it, with the monopoly being worth $100. It may 
emerge afterwards that the patent was in fact perfectly valid and would 
have issued even without the deceptive tactics, and so the actual gain from 
the lie is $0. Nonetheless, it remains important to punish the patentee for 
the attempted fraud—to deter future patentees when they expect an illicit 
gain of $100—but it is more difficult to calibrate the penalty as an 
administrative matter. 180  A patentee’s actual gain is objective and thus 
relatively feasible for a court to ascertain; a patentee’s anticipated gain is 
 
179 The assumption that individuals form and adjust expectations in reaction to actual results is 
quite standard in the decisionmaking literature. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer 
and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 283–84 
(1990). 
180 See generally Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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subjective and thus more difficult to reliably determine.181 Thus, while it is 
important to punish attempts at intentional misconduct—and the law 
usually does punish attempts—courts should generally refrain from 
punishing an immaterial misstatement unless the evidence of intent is very 
clear.182 The rationale for this hesitation is not based on moral aversion; 
rather it is that punishing attempts entails higher administrative costs for 
courts, since they must undertake the difficult (and thus costly) task of 
discerning a patentee’s subjective expected gain and levy an appropriate 
multiple as a fine. 
At a bottom-line level, therefore, I agree with the prevailing doctrine 
that evidence of intent should be very clear before imposing liability183 in 
cases where the patent is completely valid and the patentee accrues no 
other gains from the misstatement (e.g., lowered PTO fees). However, the 
doctrine is quite wrong to impose a similarly demanding standard for intent 
even in cases where the patent is invalid, 184  since making inequitable 
conduct de facto impossible to prove in all cases results in obvious 
problems of underdeterrence. 
3. The Liability Standard: An Administrative Cost Saver.—If we 
adopt the penalty structure that I advocate, what should the liability rule be 
for inequitable conduct? In other words, what should the standards be for 
intent and materiality? My argument is that, if we can calibrate the penalty 
correctly, liability should be found in almost all cases where the patentee 
makes any kind of error that creates measurable benefit to the patentee (or 
measurable harm to the PTO). 
Let me start by illustrating this argument with an example. Suppose 
the patentee makes a minor typographical error in his address. There is 
tremendous resistance to imposing inequitable conduct liability in this type 
of case because the current unenforceability remedy will impose very 
severe punishment by removing an otherwise valid patent.185 But it is not 
 
181 Cf. David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for Attempts, 
20 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (1991) (arguing that subjective assessments of the offender are more important). 
182 See Shavell, supra note 180, at 449 (“[T]he presence of ‘intent’ is generally a prerequisite for 
punishment and, in particular, for punishment of attempt.”). 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 103–19. 
184 I should make clear that I am not saying that patentees should be automatically held to have 
been acting with intent merely because a patent later turns out to be invalid. Rather, I am arguing that 
courts should be permitted to make their best guess as to the real patentee intent based on the evidence, 
unencumbered by legal fictions. As a commonsensical matter, the fact that a patentee conceals 
incriminating evidence would generally make people believe that the patentee knew the importance of 
the evidence ahead of time, unless the patentee provided some reason to believe otherwise. What the 
Federal Circuit does is use legal doctrine to artificially suppress this commonsensical intuition—it holds 
by fiat that the inference of intent cannot be made. See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. It is this 
legal fiction that I am criticizing here. 
185 See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“The need to strictly enforce the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the 
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that we want no punishment for minor typographical errors—we optimally 
would like a very minor punishment for such a minor mistake. The problem 
in current law is not that punishment is applied at all, but only that the 
punishment is disproportionate to the offense. 
If the punishment is appropriately tailored, however, there is no 
theoretical reason not to apply a $1 punishment to a $1 error. Thus, a minor 
typographical error by the patentee would attract liability, but the only 
consequence would be a $1 fine. The patent would neither be held 
unenforceable nor invalidated. There is no injustice in such an outcome. 
This theoretical precision runs into a practical problem: It is 
administratively difficult for courts to determine the correct amount of the 
fine in particular cases,186 and in cases of minor error, it is not worthwhile 
to expend these administrative costs to impose a $1 fine. A liability 
threshold that categorically exempts minor transgressions will conserve 
administrative resources, so that the judicial apparatus is only invoked for 
cases that are serious enough to warrant concern.187 Thus, even under my 
regime, patentees who make trivial errors like typos will not be penalized 
because it would likely cost more for a court to determine the correct 
amount of the fine than the fine would be worth. 
The administrative cost rationale applies similarly to the problem of 
attempts, discussed in Part IV.B.2. “Attempt” means a case where the 
patent is in fact valid, and the information suppressed is therefore actually 
immaterial, but the patentee believed that the patent was invalid and 
intentionally hid information based on that belief. The problem with 
attempts is not that the fine will always be small—the fine can be quite 
large if the patentee expected a large gain from his fraud (which only 
fortuitously failed to materialize). Instead, the problem is that the 
administrative cost of determining the fine is particularly high in cases of 
attempt because the court is required to discern the patentee’s subjective 
anticipated profit from wrongdoing rather than calculate the fine based on a 
patentee’s actual profit. A stringent liability rule makes sense in this 
context because the high administrative cost will outweigh the deterrence 
benefits in all cases except those with the highest anticipated gains from 
wrongdoing (G) and probabilities of evasion (pe). This means that a high 
liability threshold (which in practice means a high intent threshold since, in 
cases of attempt, the suppressed information is by definition immaterial) is 
justified for these cases. 
 
inequitable conduct context is paramount because the penalty for inequitable conduct is so 
severe . . . .”); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (raising the intent requirement in a case involving a clerical error). 
186 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
187 See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 29 
(1986) (“The maxim de minimis non curat lex can be given an economic meaning: do not intervene 
judicially if the costs of intervention exceed the potential stakes in the dispute.”). 
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C. Addressing Objections to the Proposal 
In this section, I address some possible objections to my proposal. The 
first two objections attack the validity of my solution, and the remaining 
four objections are based on pursuing alternative solutions. 
1. Courts Lack Information to Calibrate the Penalty.—An 
immediate objection is likely to be that courts lack the information to 
accurately impose a penalty that exactly matches the culpability in a 
particular case. This is true enough. But the information-deficit problem 
will plague any solution to the inequitable conduct problem. The relevant 
question is not whether my proposal is perfect, but only whether it achieves 
better results. And using a flexible penalty to match culpability to 
deterrence is better than the regime of current law. 
As discussed in Part III, what courts attempt to do now is use the 
liability standard as the relevant policy lever to match culpability to 
deterrence while imposing a mandatory penalty. This liability-as-policy-
lever approach is both more inherently limited, and more information 
intensive, than my proposal. The inherent limitation is that the best result 
that can be achieved through calibrating the liability standard is the result 
in Figure 5, where there is still suboptimal underdeterrence on the entire 
right portion of the diagram. This underdeterrence effect is pernicious 
because, at least on the right half of the diagram, the unenforceability 
penalty is still upside down: the most culpable cases of misconduct still 
receive the least punishment. Over the long term, this perverse result will 
inevitably generate criticism and calls for narrowing and abolition.188 In this 
sense, reliance on the liability standard as the policy lever, while leaving 
the unenforceability penalty untouched, is an unstable equilibrium that is 
politically self-defeating. 
Moreover, to even achieve the result depicted in Figure 5 by adjusting 
liability requires an impossible amount of information and very precise 
fine-tuning. What Figure 5 requires is for courts to very accurately assess 
the culpability of a particular patentee, and to very carefully calibrate the 
probability of finding liability, so that the probability is exactly offset by 
the severity of punishment. Because the probability of finding liability is 
subsequently multiplied by the severity of the punishment, even minor 
errors in the calculation will be magnified, and towards the extreme left the 
magnification will be very large. The liability-as-policy-lever approach 
thus demands that courts must not make even small errors in fine-tuning 
the liability rule, and this requires an enormous amount of information to 
make sure the result is precisely correct every time. In comparison, my 
proposal for calibrating the penalty is less information intensive and more 
tolerant of small errors because errors in assessing the anticipated gain G 
(which correlates strongly with culpability) and the probability of evasion 
 
188 See supra Part II.C. 
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pe are not subsequently magnified. And unlike the inherent defect of the 
liability rule approach, there is no reason that a flexible penalty cannot 
achieve optimal deterrence in all cases, provided the relevant information 
can be collected. 
All that said, it is true that collecting the necessary information to 
calibrate the penalty will still be costly, and so there will necessarily be 
some degree of imprecision and error in a world of limited resources and 
finite information. Therefore, in cases where the cost of adjudicating the 
penalty (encompassing both the assessment costs and the costs of error) 
exceeds the social harms of underdeterrence, it is preferable to impose a 
liability threshold and forgive small mistakes on the part of patentees—
thereby avoiding the need to adjudicate a penalty—even with the 
understanding that this will induce patentees to take less than the perfect 
amount of care.189 
2. The Penalty Will Fall on Innocent Assignees.—One concern is 
that my proposed punitive fine must necessarily be levied against the patent 
owner who brings an infringement lawsuit and is subject to a counterclaim 
by the accused infringer; a court generally would not have jurisdiction to 
impose fines on nonparties.190 In cases where the patent has been assigned 
by the initial patent applicant to an assignee, this means that the fine will be 
imposed on an innocent assignee who has done nothing wrong, while the 
truly guilty party—the initial patent applicant 191 —will be beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court. This would seem to be rather unfair and to negate 
the deterrence value of my proposed solution. 
There are several responses to this point. The first is that the same 
argument applies to existing inequitable conduct doctrine, where the 
unenforceability penalty is also applied to the patent owner, who may be an 
innocent assignee.192 Thus, in the comparison of whether my proposal is 
better than existing law, this criticism is beside the point.193 The underlying 
 
189 This point also answers the potential argument that courts should calibrate both the liability 
standard and the penalty to achieve the policy of optimal deterrence. A simple liability threshold is easy 
to administer and reduces the administrative cost of calibrating the penalty. Having a very complicated 
and finely tuned liability standard, in contrast, would increase the administrative cost with little benefit 
because optimal deterrence can be more easily achieved by calibrating the penalty. 
190 See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 (2011) (recognizing a “general rule against 
binding nonparties”). 
191 Or the prosecuting attorney, who acts on behalf of the patent applicant and whose actions will 
therefore be attributable to the principal under standard agency law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 7.04, at 171 (2006). 
192 See Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 577, 603 (2009) (“[T]he innocent assignee might just have to suffer.”). 
193 Of course, one potential reply is that the unenforceability penalty imposes no punishment on 
anyone (in cases where the patent is invalid), so my proposed fine is harsher on assignees. But the 
conventional belief is that the unenforceability penalty is an atomic bomb. To now say that the problem 
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difficulty is that courts cannot punish nonparties who are outside of their 
jurisdiction, and short of creating a qui tam cause of action 194  against 
dishonest patent applicants—where any person can affirmatively sue the 
patent applicant for the amount of the fine in the district where the patent 
applicant resides—this difficulty will remain. 
More importantly, the initial imposition of the fine on an innocent 
assignee does not mean that the monetary loss will stay on the innocent 
party. The assignee will likely now have a breach of contract action against 
the initial patent applicant, since one term of the assignment contract—
which can reasonably be implied as a matter of law even if not expressed in 
the contract itself—is that the patent being assigned was not dishonestly 
obtained.195 The monetary fine levied against the assignee can therefore be 
recovered from the initial patent applicant as a consequential loss arising 
from this breach. 196  And a court would have proper jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a breach of contract lawsuit brought by the assignee against the 
initial patent applicant. 
Indeed, this type of regime—where an innocent assignee is initially 
saddled with a loss so that he will chase down the guilty assignor and 
transfer the loss through a breach of contract suit—is quite common in 
property law.197 For example, the innocent purchaser of stolen goods is 
nonetheless required to return the goods to the true owner, which saddles 
the purchaser with the loss. 198  The rationale for this rule is that the 
purchaser will then sue the thief who sold the stolen goods to him.199 This 
regime is far better than one where an innocent assignee automatically 
became free of all liability,200 since that would induce those who commit 
 
with my proposal is that it is harsher on assignees than the unenforceability penalty would be ironic 
indeed. 
194 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (creating a qui tam cause of action against people who falsely 
mark their products as patented), repealed by Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
§ 16(b), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011). 
195 Cf. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(finding an “implicit representation of validity contained in [every] assignment of a patent”). 
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b), at 112 (1981) (allowing recovery of 
consequential losses). 
197 This is implemented by the traditional legal principle that a seller cannot convey better title than 
he has. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1335 (2011) (“Common law and civil code systems all begin with the 
fundamental principle that, ordinarily, one cannot convey greater rights than one has—a principle 
embodied in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet.”). 
198 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229, at 446 (1965) (making the possessor of stolen 
goods liable in conversion). 
199 See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2012) (creating an implied warranty of good title in every contract for 
the sale of goods). 
200 Recording statutes, which allow an innocent purchaser to take priority, operate as an exception 
from the common law rule. See Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Klapow, Attorney Malpractice for Failure 
to Require Fee Owner’s Title Insurance in a Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. 
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misconduct to immediately “cleanse” their misconduct by finding a 
cooperative buyer who would pay full price for the goods due to the 
immunity granted.201 
3. Alternative Policing Mechanisms.—My proposal in this Article is 
to preserve and improve the inequitable conduct doctrine by implementing 
the relatively small fix of replacing the mandatory unenforceability penalty 
with a more flexible system of punitive fines. The existing literature, in 
contrast, has usually advocated more drastic (and always one-sided) 
changes to narrow the doctrine and reduce deterrence.202 The most drastic 
narrowing change advocated has been to abolish the inequitable conduct 
doctrine altogether. 203  I shall address that suggestion separately in Part 
IV.C.5. 
The obvious difficulty with narrowing or abolishing the inequitable 
conduct doctrine is that it is the primary doctrinal safeguard against 
patentee dishonesty.204 As a consequence, critics of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine frequently propose placing greater reliance on other policing 
mechanisms.205 None of the proposed mechanisms, however, offer adequate 
solutions to the problem of patentee dishonesty and underdeterrence seen 
on the right side of Figure 1. Because the conventional wisdom has not 
appreciated the underdeterrence effect, 206  its proffered solutions do not 
adequately address this concern. 
The most frequently cited alternative is for the PTO to enforce 
disciplinary measures against patent attorneys who engage in misconduct, 
under which the PTO can define for itself both the standards for liability 
and the appropriate penalty for violation.207 The problem with this approach 
is threefold. First, the PTO itself has shown absolutely no interest in 
performing this policing function, having unilaterally stopped enforcement 
 
REV. 407, 429 (2000). But recording statutes effectively require purchasers to search title registries and 
thus are not blanket immunities for purchasers. 
201 See Bagley, supra note 192 (calling this “patent laundering”). 
202 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–78; Wasserman, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]his article 
advocates limiting the doctrine of inequitable conduct and pursuing alternative avenues for increasing 
patent quality.”). 
203 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 123 (calling for 
abolition); Lynch, supra note 7, at 9 (same). 
204 Stijepko Tokic, In re “DDAVP” Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation: Is the Second Circuit’s 
“Massage” the Way to Relieve the Key Pressure Points Between the Patent System and Antitrust 
Laws?, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 536, 539–40 (2010). 
205 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 122–23 
(arguing that “invalidity, disciplinary action, and reputational concerns” provide alternative 
mechanisms of deterring dishonesty); Wasserman, supra note 12, at 3. 
206 See supra Part I.F. 
207 See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 1112 (arguing that administrative “agencies are 
generally held to be the masters of their own procedures” and “the best punishment might be such 
disciplinary sanctions”). 
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of existing inequitable conduct doctrine since 1988.208 Second, as the PTO 
itself explained to the Federal Circuit in Therasense, it has neither the 
institutional capability nor resources to perform such an enforcement 
role.209 On resources, the PTO is already “chronically underfunded,”210 and 
on institutional capability, it is hobbled by the fact that it cannot issue 
subpoenas or compel testimony.211 Moreover, the statute of limitations for 
PTO discipline is five years,212 and it would be rare for dishonest conduct to 
surface merely one-quarter of the way into a patent’s lifetime.213 
Third, the PTO’s enforcement power is limited to disciplining patent 
attorneys, not their clients.214 This is often cited as an advantage, in that 
dishonest conduct is usually perpetrated by the attorney and not directly by 
the client.215 However, such a view is backwards. While it is true enough 
that the attorney usually performs the conduct, the benefit and motivation 
lie with the client. A client obviously benefits from gaining an invalid 
patent that the PTO should have denied and would have denied if the truth 
was known. A prosecuting attorney has almost nothing to gain from using 
dishonesty to obtain an undeserved patent for his client aside from higher 
fees (which the client would be willing to pay only as a function of the 
 
208 See supra Part II.C.2. 
209 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party 
at 15–16, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (No. 
2008-1511) (arguing that it is “not possible or practical” to rely on PTO discipline). 
210 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of 
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 813 (2008). But see Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for 
Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1986 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he PTO’s financial 
position [has] steadily improved” since 1994). 
211 See 35 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (limiting the PTO’s subpoena power to contested cases); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 11.38 (2012) (stating that a disciplinary proceeding becomes a contested case only after an initial 
investigation is concluded). The Federal Circuit recently construed § 24 to cover all proceedings in 
which PTO regulations provide that evidence may be taken by deposition. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis 
Corp., No. 2012-1244, 2013 WL 1136627, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). The PTO’s rules for initial 
investigations specify that it may request information from “[a]ny person who may reasonably be 
expected to provide information and evidence needed in connection with the grievance or investigation” 
but do not specify that this can occur by means of a deposition. 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(f)(1)(iii). Given 
Abbott, it is no longer completely clear that the PTO lacks subpoena power during initial investigations, 
but I would still regard this as the best reading of existing law. 
212 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (time limit for the “enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture”). The 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act extends this to ten years. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(k), 125 Stat. 
284, 291 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 32 (West Supp. 2013)). This is still only half the time period 
during which the misconduct may prove effective. 
213 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (twenty-year patent term); see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, supra note 209, at 15–16 (“[T]he 
PTO infrequently learns of the inequitable conduct within [the five-year] time frame . . . .”). 
214 See § 32. 
215 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 1112 (“Inventors and patentees might fairly think that, if 
misconduct occurs at the agency, the best punishment might be such disciplinary sanctions (which fall 
on the offending attorneys) rather than the sanction of patent unenforceability (which falls primarily on 
the patentee).”). 
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benefit gained). If the point of disciplinary sanctions is to remove the 
benefits of misconduct and create deterrence, it makes obvious sense to 
impose the sanctions on the client, which the PTO cannot do. 
An alternative that does allow imposing sanctions on the client is 
criminal prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which criminalizes 
“mak[ing] [a] materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation” to a government agency.216 The problem with this approach 
is largely the same as that of relying on PTO discipline. The Department of 
Justice has shown even less interest in assuming the enforcement function 
than the PTO has. As far as I could determine, the last reported case 
involving a § 1001 prosecution for dishonesty to the PTO occurred in 
1976,217 and the one before that appears to be from 1934.218 One potential 
reason—aside from limited prosecutorial resources—might be that there is 
a five-year statute of limitations on § 1001 prosecutions,219 and, like the 
PTO statute, it begins running from the time the offense is committed (i.e., 
not from when the fraud is discovered).220 Because it is unlikely that fraud 
on the PTO will be discovered in five years—and patentees can virtually 
ensure this by waiting six years before doing anything with their patent221—
there is little credible deterrence from criminal prosecution. To be sure, one 
can always argue for extending the statute of limitations—though that 
creates many potential side effects, since § 1001 is a general statute 
applicable to many government agencies—but even then it is unlikely that 
the DOJ will show any inclination to prosecute patent applicants, given 
limited prosecutorial resources and the fact that such prosecutions have so 
rarely occurred. 
A third option that relies on private enforcement (and therefore does 
not suffer the problem of lack of inclination and resources by government 
agencies), has no statute of limitations issue, and also allows super-
restitutionary damages is a private antitrust counterclaim under the doctrine 
of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp. 222  The Walker Process doctrine holds that a patent plaintiff who 
fraudulently obtains an invalid patent and then files an infringement suit 
upon it commits an antitrust violation. 223  The standard remedy for an 
 
216 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006). 
217 See United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976). 
218 See Meehan v. United States, 70 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1934). 
219 § 3282(a). 
220 Id. (barring prosecution unless “instituted within five years next after such offense shall have 
been committed”). 
221 Patentees can wait six years before filing infringement suits without losing any damages. 35 
U.S.C. § 286 (2006) (six-year limitation on damages). 
222 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
223 See id. at 176–77. 
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antitrust violation is treble damages based on the amount of competitive 
injury.224 
In many ways, therefore, a counterclaim by an accused infringer under 
the Walker Process doctrine fits my proposed reform: rather than rendering 
the patent unenforceable for the dishonesty, a monetary penalty is imposed. 
This penalty is over and above the invalidation of the patent that would 
occur anyway (and thereby achieves deterrence). As the doctrine is 
currently constituted, however, Walker Process is an inadequate substitute 
for the inequitable conduct doctrine for three reasons. 
First, courts impose an even higher burden of proof for Walker 
Process allegations than for inequitable conduct allegations (if this is even 
possible),225 which makes Walker Process claims basically impossible to 
prove and the doctrine a virtual dead letter. 226  One study found that, 
between 1985 and 2001, only three Walker Process claims were 
successful.227 Even with treble damages, the chance of evasion is so high 
that there is likely to be no meaningful deterrence against patentee 
dishonesty. 
Second, a Walker Process claim requires the accused infringer to 
prove other antitrust elements, such as defining the relevant “market” being 
monopolized and ultimately the fact of economic monopolization itself 
(which a patent does not necessarily establish).228 These antitrust elements 
are not relevant to the wrong that inequitable conduct doctrine seeks to 
prevent, which is dishonesty to the PTO. Relying on Walker Process as the 
primary policing mechanism for fraud on the PTO, therefore, imposes 
needless barriers to achieving proper deterrence. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Walker Process doctrine can 
be easily avoided by a cunning patent applicant who can simply assign the 
patent to someone else and thereby “cleanse” the misconduct.229 This is 
because Walker Process requires the plaintiff in litigation to know of the 
 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
225 See, e.g., Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“To demonstrate 
Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both materiality and intent 
than are required to show inequitable conduct.”). 
226 Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling with Civil RICO, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 94 (2009); 
see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 11.2(f), at 11-25 (2d ed. Supp. 2011) 
(“Walker Process claims are usually not successful.”); David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, 
Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation 
Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 99 (2001) (“Walker Process claims [are] . . . extremely difficult 
to plead and prove . . . .”). 
227 See Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 226, at 99 n.22. 
228 See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177–78 (“Without a definition of [the relevant] market there is 
no way to measure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy competition.”); see also Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that a patent does not establish market 
power for antitrust purposes). 
229 See Bagley, supra note 192 (calling this “patent laundering”). 
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invalidity of the patent and its fraudulent history.230 As described in Part 
IV.C.2, allowing assignees to take a patent unencumbered by the assignor’s 
fraud opens an enormous loophole because the guilty assignor ultimately 
benefits through the ability to charge a higher price in the transfer. 
Of course, the Walker Process doctrine can be modified to remedy all 
of these defects, though it would probably require a Supreme Court 
decision to do so. But at that point we are merely talking about the 
doctrinal label under which my proposed reform would be implemented, 
not its substance. Whether my proposal is implemented under the heading 
of a “modified Walker Process doctrine” or a “modified inequitable 
conduct doctrine” really does not matter. What matters is that there is a 
doctrine that imposes a more than restitutionary remedy (i.e., real 
punishment) whenever patent applicants commit highly culpable fraud in 
the PTO. My suggestion is to impose punitive fines under the inequitable 
conduct doctrine, but the same substantive effect can be achieved under 
other doctrinal labels. 
4. Attorney-Fee Awards as a Punitive Remedy.—Another potential 
objection to my analysis is that current law already permits an additional 
monetary enforcement mechanism, namely the possibility of awarding 
attorneys’ fees to accused infringers. A judgment of inequitable conduct 
allows, but does not require, an award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the 
accused infringer.231 Since this award of attorneys’ fees creates an effect 
over and above simply forfeiting the patent, it provides additional 
deterrence that mitigates the underdeterrence effect. The prospect of 
receiving attorneys’ fees also provides some incentive for accused 
infringers to pursue inequitable conduct arguments even in cases where the 
patent is invalid. 
While the potential for attorneys’ fees ameliorates the underdeterrence 
problems I have identified to some extent, it is clearly inadequate, at least 
under current practice. First, the chance of receiving an attorneys’ fee 
award is miniscule: the chance of winning an inequitable conduct defense 
is already very small (because the burden of proof is so high),232 and courts 
usually deny attorneys’ fees even when inequitable conduct is proven.233 In 
these circumstances, it would make little sense for an accused infringer to 
investigate and litigate an inequitable conduct issue solely for the prospect 
of an attorneys’ fee award: the additional costs of investigation and 
litigation must be expended upfront, while the chance of recapturing them 
is remote. 
 
230 See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177 n.5. 
231 See Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
232 Petherbridge et al., supra note 16, at 1308–10. 
233 Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 85, at 168 (noting that even when inequitable conduct is proven, 
courts awarded attorneys’ fees only 40% of the time over the last ten years). 
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Second, the amount of attorneys’ fees that can possibly be awarded is 
inherently less than the value of a fraudulently obtained patent because it 
would never make sense to spend more in attorneys’ fees than the value of 
the patent at stake. Combining the low probability of attorneys’ fee awards 
with their inherently limited value means that no patentee is ever likely to 
be deterred from dishonest behavior due to the availability of this sanction. 
As even the courts have long recognized, attorneys’ fees are “of secondary 
importance” in the inequitable conduct calculus,234 and without a stronger 
penalty, “the relationship of confidence and trust between applicants and 
the Patent Office [would not] have any real meaning.”235 While courts are 
mistaken in believing that the unenforceability remedy provides a stronger 
penalty that deters serious patentee misconduct, the belief that attorneys’ 
fees are inadequate is quite correct. 
Of course, courts can change their doctrine to make attorney fee 
sanctions easier to impose. And if attorneys’ fees were regularly imposed, 
the prospect of such fees may be enough to induce at least some accused 
infringers to continue pursuing an inequitable conduct claim even when the 
unenforceability penalty is superfluous due to the invalidity of the patent. 
Even then, however, relying on attorneys’ fees as the primary remedy 
would be problematic because attorneys’ fees will always be less than the 
value of the patent, and in the very worst cases of misconduct such a cap 
would be too low to provide adequate deterrence.236 In short, while attorney 
fee sanctions can work as a complement to my proposed system of punitive 
fines, they cannot be a full substitute and thus cannot save the existing 
system. 
5. Abolish the Duty of Candid Disclosure Instead.—The most 
extreme alternative solution that is usually suggested is to abolish the 
inequitable conduct doctrine entirely.237 This has the obvious problem that 
inequitable conduct is the primary—indeed, for all practical purposes, the 
only—enforcement mechanism to ensure patentee honesty in dealings with 
the patent office.238 To abolish inequitable conduct, therefore, would leave 
 
234 See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 & n.14. (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
235 Id. at 795. 
236 To be sure, at the extremes, this problem also affects my proposal. Namely, the proper fine for a 
privately valuable but fraudulently obtained patent (e.g., a patent on a blockbuster drug) would be so 
high that a court would likely recoil at the “sticker shock,” and in any case, a fine that is so high that it 
drives the patentee past the point of insolvency has no additional deterrence effect because the patentee 
is then judgment proof. See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(a) (2012) (providing for waiver of 
fine if defendant is unable to pay). But at least the implicit “cap” is much higher under my proposal 
than one where the amount of punitive fines is capped by attorneys’ fees expended. 
237 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 121–23 (calling 
for abolition); Lynch, supra note 7, at 9 (same). 
238 See Dolak, supra note 17, at 17–22 (arguing that alternative proposals are unsatisfactory); see 
also supra Part IV.C.3. 
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no enforcement mechanism for the duty of candor (also known as the duty 
of disclosure).239 
One response to this is that we should abolish the duty of disclosure as 
well.240 The argument is usually framed by noting that the United States is 
the only country with a duty of disclosure, but our patent system is not of a 
noticeably higher quality than those of other countries. 241  I have two 
responses to this argument. 
The first is that it is not quite true. A duty of disclosure is inherent in 
every patent system242 because a core part of the patent bargain is honest 
disclosure of the invention.243 Without a duty of disclosure and a policing 
mechanism to ensure honesty, a patent applicant could fabricate an 
invention by, for instance, conjuring out of thin air clinical trial results 
showing a cure for AIDS and then wielding any patent obtained to terrorize 
competitors, all without penalty even if the applicant is caught.244 Thus, 
every patent system has a duty of honest disclosure and requires a 
mechanism to enforce honest disclosure to the patent office. Other 
countries generally have less onerous requirements of disclosure,245 and 
they enforce the requirement using different policing mechanisms such as 
 
239 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty 
to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability . . . .”); 
see also id. § 1.105(a)(1) (allowing the PTO to demand disclosure of additional information beyond that 
required to be automatically disclosed under § 1.56). 
240 See, e.g., Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 365 (2011) (recommending either “abolishing the duty of candor 
altogether” or at least limiting it such that “no duty of disclosure would be imposed on an applicant 
unless an examiner determined that information was needed but the examiner was unable to access it 
herself”). 
241 See id. at 346–47 (“T]he duty of disclosure is not only failing to achieve its objective of 
providing more comprehensive patent examination, but also is contributing to poorer quality [compared 
to other countries] . . . .”). 
242 At a minimum, every country requires filing a patent application, which inherently requires 
disclosing information. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 
52, art. 4 (establishing system of patent application filing); European Patent Convention art. 83, Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (“The European patent application 
must disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a 
person skilled in the art.”). 
243 See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The 
disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))). 
244 Cf. Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 830 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (patent applicant fabricating evidence of inventorship). 
245 See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 242, art. 124 (allowing the European Patent 
Office to demand applicants provide information on prior art but not requiring automatic disclosure as 
the United States does). 
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patent office discipline or perjury prosecutions,246 but every patent system 
inherently requires some amount of disclosure from patent applicants. 
The second point that follows is that the question is not whether there 
should be a duty of disclosure but only the scope of that duty and the 
policing mechanism used to enforce it. The scope of the duty of disclosure 
is a worthwhile question,247  but it is tangential to the argument of this 
Article on improving the inequitable conduct doctrine. As long as some 
duty of disclosure exists, there will be a corresponding need for a punitive 
remedy for its breach, and my argument in this Article is that inequitable 
conduct is the best doctrinal mechanism by which this can be 
implemented.248 This is not to say that current inequitable conduct doctrine 
performs this function well—it doesn’t, as Figure 1 shows—but only that 
inequitable conduct is the best mechanism available. It can be reformed to 
achieve the desired result with only slight doctrinal adjustments. 
6. Reducing the Penalty for Invalidity Instead.—Finally, an 
alternative worth discussing is the possibility of reducing the penalty for 
invalidity instead. That is, the problem I identify comes from the overlap 
between the remedy for invalidity and the remedy for dishonest behavior. 
In theory we could solve this overlap either by imposing additional 
penalties for dishonest behavior (as I have proposed) or by reducing the 
penalties for invalidity; both would create a marginal difference.249 And 
though reducing the penalty for invalidity might be counterintuitive at 
first—to my knowledge it has not been proposed in the academic 
literature—it finds some support in historical practice.250 
Until the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,251 a judgment of 
invalidity did not invalidate the patent but only provided a personal 
defense. A patent that was held invalid in one case could still be asserted 
and enforced in future cases. 252  The only way to truly “invalidate” a 
patent—to permanently revoke it—was to obtain a writ of scire facias, 
 
246 See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 92(5) (U.K.) (making perjury penalties applicable to 
proceedings in the European Patent Office). 
247 On this question, I am inclined to agree with Thomas Cotter’s formulation that the ultimate 
objective is to induce applicant disclosure “only if it is less costly for the applicant to disclose the 
information than it would be for the examiner to find it herself,” and even then only if the disclosure is 
net socially beneficial. Cotter, supra note 62, at 752–53. 
248 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
249 This is the mirror reflection of the observation in equal protection jurisprudence that we can 
achieve parity by “level[ing] up” or “level[ing] down.” See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 787 (2011). We can also achieve disparity by going up or down. 
250 See John F. Duffy & Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid? 2 (2012), 
available at https://www.law.uh.edu/wipip2012/Abstracts/LemleyAbstract_wipip2012.pdf (discussing 
historical practice). 
251 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
252 See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1936). 
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which required proof of fraud.253 This regime provided some deterrence 
against dishonest behavior because dishonesty could result in permanent 
revocation while invalidity would merely result in a one-off judgment. 
Although overruling Blonder-Tongue and returning to the traditional 
regime might provide a means for deterring patentee dishonesty, it would 
create other problems.254 Namely, it would result in many patents covering 
old, useless, and obvious inventions staying on the books even after their 
invalidity has been discovered and proven, so long as the patentees 
engaged in no misconduct. Given the widespread concern over the 
prevalence of undeserved monopolies impeding commerce and 
innovation255—a concern that remains even if patentees do not intentionally 
obtain fraudulent patents—it is unlikely that the benefits of this solution 
would outweigh the costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Three propositions dominate the conventional wisdom on inequitable 
conduct. The first proposition is that the unenforceability penalty is always 
a draconian “atomic bomb.”256 The second proposition is that inequitable 
conduct is frequently alleged but rarely successful in litigation and that this 
implies the allegations are generally unmeritorious and patentees are almost 
never truly dishonest.257 The third proposition is that the proper solution 
involves changing the liability threshold so that overdeterrence should be 
met by narrowing liability, 258  while underdeterrence should be met by 
 
253 See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 440 (1871) (noting that a writ of scire facias to 
revoke a patent could issue only in cases of conflicting patents or for fraud). Additionally, the writ of 
scire facias could only be obtained by the government, so the PTO could not hand over enforcement to 
private parties. Notably, the PTO did not stop enforcement of inequitable conduct until 1988. See supra 
text accompanying note 123. 
254 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating 
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004) (“We . . . should not solve the free rider problem 
that Blonder-Tongue creates simply by reinstating Triplett.”). 
255 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“[There is an] important public 
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the 
public domain.”); see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8–11 (2008) (arguing that too many patents 
impede innovation); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, exec. summ., at 5. 
256 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
257 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (allegations 
are “an absolute plague” because accused infringers “get anywhere with the accusation in but a small 
percentage of the cases”). 
258 See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (tightening the intent and materiality elements); Star 
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (raising pleading 
standards). 
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expanding liability. 259  As this Article has demonstrated, each of these 
propositions is wrong. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the unenforceability penalty is 
not always a draconian atomic bomb. While it is true enough that the 
penalty is very harsh when applied to minor errors, it is equally true that the 
penalty is practically nonexistent in cases of serious patentee fraud, where 
unenforceability is redundant with invalidity. Thus, at the same time it 
generates too much deterrence against minor errors, the unenforceability 
penalty also creates insufficient deterrence against the very worst types of 
patentee misconduct. The conventional wisdom that focuses only on 
preventing overdeterrence, and not underdeterrence, thus misses half the 
equation. 
Similarly, although inequitable conduct allegations are rarely 
successfully litigated, this fact does not prove that the allegations are 
unmeritorious or that patentees are rarely seriously dishonest. Rather, the 
low win rate is virtually certain to occur given accused infringers’ upside-
down incentives to litigate. Judges will rarely see the very worst types of 
misconduct litigated as inequitable conduct cases because in those cases 
accused infringers will choose to devote their resources to a defense of 
invalidity that is far easier to prove and almost equally rewarding. The false 
inference that is normally drawn from low success rates in litigation—that 
this means that the allegations are generally frivolous and that patentees are 
generally honest—in turn prompts judges to narrow the inequitable conduct 
doctrine. This perpetuates a vicious cycle, since the narrowing of 
inequitable conduct doctrine makes the defense even less appealing to 
accused infringers in litigation and means that even fewer meritorious cases 
will be brought to the judges’ attention. This vicious cycle continues even 
when the underlying empirical assumption (that patentees rarely or never 
engage in serious misconduct in the PTO) has no valid foundation. 
Once the nature of this upside-down-incentive effect is understood, it 
also becomes clear that changing the liability standard will not solve the 
fundamental problem. Neither narrowing liability nor expanding liability 
will achieve good outcomes. As seen in Figure 2, narrowing liability can 
reduce or even eliminate the overdeterrence problem, but only at the cost of 
maintaining or even exacerbating the underdeterrence problem. 
Conversely, as seen in Figure 3, expanding liability will not meaningfully 
resolve the underdeterrence problem, but can significantly exacerbate the 
overdeterrence problem. In all cases, a significant underdeterrence problem 
will remain if reform is focused on the liability standard. The conventional 
focus on liability standards, therefore, is another reflection of the fact that 
the underdeterrence side of the equation has been overlooked. 
 
259 See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (advocating a lower materiality 
standard to prevent underdeterrence). 
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Rather than modifying the liability standard, a more fruitful avenue for 
reform would be to focus on calibrating the penalty to match punishment to 
culpability. Because the unenforceability penalty in fact achieves the very 
opposite of the desired effect, it should be abolished. In its place, a system 
of punitive fines that are calculated according to my proposed formula can 
achieve better outcomes, with less information cost, than a system based on 
modifying the inequitable conduct liability rule and preserving the 
unenforceability remedy. 
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